Speaking for the Police by Carrington, Frank
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 61 | Issue 2 Article 12
1970
Speaking for the Police
Frank Carrington
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminology is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Frank Carrington, Speaking for the Police, 61 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 244 (1970)
Tna 3ouanAL or CRIMINAL LAW, CRIMINOLOGY AND POLICE SCIENCE Vol. 61, No. 2
Copyright @ 1970 by Northwestern University School of Law Printed in U.S.A.
SPEAKING FOR THE POLICE
FRANK CARRINGTON
The writer holds an LL.B. degree from the University of Michigan and a LL.M. from Northwestern
University. He is a member of the Ohio and Colorado Bars. A graduate of Northwestern's Police Legal
Advisor Program, Mr. Carrington presently serves as the Police Legal Coordinator and a Special
Police Officer for the Denver Police Department. He is also a legal counsel to the Colorado Association
of Chiefs of Police. His prior law enforcement experience includes work as a prosecutor's investigator
in Lynchburg, Virginia; a Criminal Investigator in the United States Marine Corps; six and one-half
years as a Special Agent (Criminal Investigator), with the Intelligence Division, U. S. Treasury
Department, assigned to Organized Crime and Racketeering Investigations; and, one and one-half
years as Legal Advisor to the Vice Squad of the Chicago Police Department. In addition, he is the
Chairman of the Law Enforcement Legal Unit, a national, professional association of Police Legal
Advisors.-EnrOR.
The policeman of today can truly claim the
status of a professional. At no time in our history
has the public received better police service, man
for man and department for department. Yet, in
one area, the policeman, as a professional, has ne-
glected an important duty to the public and him-
self. This is the duty to speak out, to become
highly articulate, on those areas of the law which
vitally affect the law enforcement function.
Crime is, without doubt, our number one do-
mestic problem, and public demand for protection
against society's lawless elements has reached a
peak. At the same time, laws and court decisions
which prevent the police from affording this pro-
tection confront law enforcement on every side.
It is in this area especially that the police must
become articulate. They must show to the public,
the legislatures, and to the courts, just how a given
law or decision adversely affects police effective-
ness; further, if possible they should present a
solution to the problem that has been created.
This article postulates this duty of the police to
speak out and gives examples of areas where speak-
ing out is most necessary. It presents cases of police
articulation in the recent past. Finally, it considers
the question of who should speak for the police.
IE.g, in a speech to the United States Senate on Au-
gust 11, 1969, Senator John L. McClellan of Arkansas
pointed out that since 1960 the Supreme Court of the
United States has reversed 63 of 112 Federal criminal
convictions and 113 of 144 state criminal convictions.
The Senator stated: "I simply cannot believe that our
Federal Circuit Judges are so incapable and lacking in
qualifications or that our State Supreme Courts are so
incompetent and prone to error as to warrant such an
overwhelming record of reversals by the Supreme
Court". S. Cong. Reg., 91st. Cong. 1st Sess. Vol. 115,
No. 136, p.S 9565. Aug. 11, 1969.
No longer can the police remain silent concern-
ing the laws under which they must operate. The
status of a professional carries with it the responsi-
bility to be articulate on professional matters; the
police of this country must undertake and accept
this responsibility without delay.
THE DUTY TO SPEAK OUT
In October of 1969, a Conference on Preventive
Detention was held at the Center for Continuing
Education of the University of Chicago. The flier
announcing the Conference listed twenty-three
panelists for the three day affair. These panelists,
to quote from the flier represented: "... federal
and state legisjators and officials concerned with
criminal justice; professors of law and political
science; and attorneys and members of the judici-
ary".2 Not one policeman was listed on the panel!
Preventive detention, the right of a judge to
deny bail to an individual who is found to be
dangerous, is one of the most crucial and contro-
versial issues facing our criminal justice system
today. It is wholly admirable that such a star-
studded panel should be convened to discuss this
issue; and the interests of the panelists' in this
2The address on the flier for further details was:
Preventive Detention, Urban Research Corporation,
5464 South Shore Drive, Chicago, Illinois, 60615;
Phone (312) 955-0436.
$The panelists, broken down by occupation were:
U.S. Senators: Samuel C. Ervin (D-N.C.); Charles God-
dell (R-N.Y.)
U.S. Representatives: Claude Pepper (D-Fla.)
Law Professors: Norval R. Morris; University of Chi-
cago; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr, University of Chicago;
Dallis H. Oaks, University of Chicago; Wayne LaFave,
University of Illinois; Jerald Israel, University of
Michigan; Daniel J. Freed, Yale University; Richard
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area are beyond question. Why, however, should
that group, whose interest in preventive detention
is certainly of equal immediacy with that of the
listed panelists, be excluded?
It is the policeman on the street who must face
the bullets of an armed robber who, free on bail
from two previous armed robbery arrests, is com-
mitting yet another crime to secure money to pay
for attorneys and bondsmen.
The desperation of an addict's need to feed his
habit is a substantial factor in the danger that
officers must face daily; and, an addict released on
bail after several arrests compounds his despera-
tion with each offense and release. The police
executive must take into account these tendencies
of persons released on bond in his crime statistic
compilation and in his allocation of manpower to
high crime areas. In short, the working policeman,
on all levels, is intimately concerned with preven-
tive detention; yet, if the selection of panelists for
the Chicago Conference on this subject is any
criterion, the policeman must be content to let
this problem be worked out on a loftier level,
without the intrusion of the people who must deal
with it in actual practice.
Is it proper that the police remain silent in mat-
ters that affect them so critically? Are policemen
somehow excluded from the free speech provisions
of the First Amendment? The contention of this
article is that the police of this country have a
duty to society, and to themselves, as professionals,
to speak out on matters that adversely affect them
in the exercise of their law enforcement duty.
With few exceptions, 4 the police establishment
Buxbaum, University of California at Berkley.
Other Professors: Charles Hamilton, Political Science,
Columbia University
Criminal Justice: Donald A. Santarelli, Deputy U.S.
Attorney General for the Administration of Criminal
Justice; Hans W. Mattick, Center for Studies in Crimi-
nal justice; University of Chicago; James R. Thomp-
son, Chief, Criminal Justice Division, Illinois Attorney
General's Office
Bail and Corrections: John Locke, Bail Reform Study,
National Bureau of Standards George McGraff; Com-
missioner of Corrections, New York City
Social Agencies: Mrs. Sarah Carey, The Urban Coali-
tion, Washington, D.C.; Patrick Murphy, Public Order
and Safety Studies, Urban Institute, Washington, D.C.;
Patricia M. Wald, Neighborhood Legal Services, Wash-
ington, D.C.
Miscellaneous: Thomas Bradley; City Councilman, Los
Angeles; Dick Gregory; Civil Rights Leader; David
Burnham; Reporter, New York Times.
4 For instance, two police executives who were highly
articulate were Orlando W. Wilson, Superintendent of
the Chicago Police who retired in 1967; and, Thomas
Reddin, Chief of Police in 1969 to become a television
newscaster for Station KTLA, Los Angeles. Chief Red-
in this country has remained silent on issues that
vitally concern the effectiveness of how they do
their job. It is not the purpose of this paper to
explore in any detail the reasons for this reticence;
but, it would seem that police silence in the past
has been based on tradition, and on a general feel-
ing in the police community that policemen as a
group are inarticulate and should keep their si-
lence. In one of its most incisive observations, the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice pointed this out:
".... many ... decisions [are] made without the
needs of law enforcement, and the police policies
that are designed to meet those needs, being effec-
tively presented to the court. If judges are to
balance accurately law enforcement needs and hu-
man rights, the former must be articulated. They
seldom are. Few legislatures and police adminis-
trators have defined in detail how and under what
conditions certain police practices are to be used.
As a result, the courts often must rely on intuition
and common sense in what kinds of police action
are reasonable or necessary, even though their de-
cisions about the actions of one police officer can
restrict police activity in the entire nation."
(emphasis added)5
In addition to this feeling on the part of the
police that they are in no position to articulate
their problems, it is fashionable for intellectuals in
the fields of the social sciences to advance the
theory that the police should be "seen but not
heard." 6 Whatever the reasons for past reluctance
din may be in the vanguard of a "new breed" who break
away from police work, as such, to enhance the scope of
articulation of police problems. Thus, he is quoted in
TV Guide, for November 1, 1969: "When I found that
I could reach more people in a single TV broadcast than
I could in two years of speech making as Los Angeles
Police Chief, I became a TV newscaster". (p. 26)
Report of the President's Commission on Law En-
forcement and the Administration of Justice, p. 94.
6 The best example of this point of view may be found
in the "Skolnick Report," a report submitted by Jerome
Skolnick, Director, Task Force on Violent Aspects of
Protest and Confrontation of the National Commission
on the Causes and Prevention of Violence" by Ballan-
tine Books, New York, N.Y. (1969) Chapter 7 of this
book, "The Police in Protest" is perhaps one of the most
virulently anti-police pieces of writing ever to be pub-
lished. Among other things, Skolnick takes the police to
task for becoming "politicized", i.e. for speaking out.
From reading Chapter 7, one hastens to re-read the
First Amendment to find the language that excludes the
police from its provisions.
Except as an example of an "intellectual" attack on
the police, the Skolnick Report is actually of little con-
sequence, and no policeman who is conscientiously at-
tempting to do his job should be concerned with the
bitter characterization of the police stemming from the
social theories of the author of the report and his staff.
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on the part of the police to speak out on the issues
that affect them, it is now time for the entire law
enforcement community to become vocal. The
Attorney General of the United States, the Hon.
John N. Mitchell, put the problem squarely before
the International Association of Chiefs of Police:
"There has been a tendency to ignore the
law enforcement community in favor of social
scientists who can explain the motivations of
the criminal, but who can do little to protect
the innocent against the mugger or armed
robber".7
The police would be well advised to take a cue
from these words of the top law enforcement
officer in the United States.
The police have been counseled to become vocal
from other than "inside" law enforcement sources.
Mr. Mark Furstenburg, then Press Assistant to
Senator Joseph Tydings of Maryland, in an article
in the Police Chief, the magazine of the Interna-
tional Association of Chiefs of Police, has exhorted
the police to "Speak Out on the Issues".' Mr.
Furstenburg took the police to task for remaining
silent on crucial issues facing society today; and,
put forth the theory that, by the very nature of
their jobs, the police are constantly involved in
politics, though not in a partisan sense, whether
they like it or not. Addressing the police directly,
Mr. Furstenburg summarized:
"You have no choice but to be involved.
If you choose the involvement of splendid
isolation, you risk a great deal. You risk fur-
ther alienation, less public understanding and
sympathy, and legislative action based on in-
adequate information.
"The alternative is to get into the public
debate as active participants, share your
knowledge with legislatures and courts and
help the public to appreciate you".9
The police would do well to heed this succinct
advice from a non-policeman.
Police articulation can cover the widest range of
7 Address by Hon. John Mitchell, Attorney General
of the United States at the Annual Convention of the
International Association of Chiefs of Police, Hotel
Fountainbleau, Miami Beach, Florida; September 29,
1969.
8 The Police Chief, August 1968, "Police and Politics-
Speak Out on the Issues," by Mark Furstenburg. Mr.
Furstenburg is now Public Information Director for the
International Association of Chiefs of Police.
9 Ibid.
subjects imaginable. It must inevitably enter into
areas of politics, police unions, and other ques-
tions concerning the policeman and his relation-
ships to the community as a whole.'0 Although
some limitations in those areas may be in order,
there should be no doubt as to the propriety of
police articulation on all questions regarding our
laws, both judge-made and statutory, and on
questions of violations of those laws, as these laws
and their violations affect the performance of the
police function. It is in this area, that of the law,
that police silence is most noticeable; and, it is in
this area that the police have the most at stake,
for the professional policeman is bound to operate
within the confines of existing law whether he
agrees with the law or not. The importance of the
vocal policeman is that he may be a force for
changing the laws that hamper his effectiveness.
In this context of "speaking out on the law"
there appear to be two basic elements that impose
a duty on the police to speak out:
1) A duty to the public, since a policeman is a
public servant; and,
2) A duty to the policeman himself, as a pro-
fessional and as a working officer.
The first of these duties, the public duty, arises
from the fact that it is the public, whom the police-
man is sworn to protect, and only the public, as a
whole, has a right to determine how much or how
little protection it wants and needs. Under our
system of government, the public delegates the
law-making power to the legislature and the power
of interpreting laws to the courts; in the final
analysis, however, the power to change either the
laws or the interpretation placed on these laws
resides in the people.
The problem to which the writer is addressing
himself may be fruitfully considered in the con-
text of recent United States Supreme Court de-
cisions restricting the police and enlarging the
rights of criminal defendants and suspects. Does
the public agree with this expansion of individual
civil liberties while society grows daily more un-
safe? If public opinion polls are any indication,
the answer is clearly "no". A Gallup Poll published
in the Denver Post on February 16, 1969, entitled,
"Public Wants 'Harder Line' to Win War on
10 For an excellent discussion of police and politics
see: "Police Power-An In-Depth Survey" in the Den-
ver Post, December 25, 1968. This is a syndicated article
from the Washington Post concerning the "politiciza-
tion" of the police in Detroit, Boston, New York, Phila-
delphia and Washington, D.C.
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Crime," revealed the following attitude towards
the courts:
"This was the question asked of 1,471 adults
across the nation in the latest survey: 'In
general, do you think the courts in this area
deal too harshly or not harshly enough with
criminals?
"The latest results and trend:
1969 % 1968 % 1965 %
Not harshly enough...........75 63 48
About right .................. 13 19 34
Too harshly .................. 2 2 2
No opinion ................... 10 16 16")
This national survey was mirrored by a Denver
Post survey published on March 16, 1969. The
purpose of the survey was to measure attitudes
towards crime held by the people of Denver. Re-
porting on the results of questioning, 1600 resi-
dents of Metropolitan Denver, the article stated:
"By a 3-1 margin, they will cite crime and
violence as the cities' biggest problem".
and,
"Other individuals by a 5-1 margin say police
forces should have added manpower and they
should be given more authority to arrest
criminals. Others maintain strongly that the
courts are entirely too lenient"."
As the demand for protection from the lawless
elements in our society has grown, it is highly sig-
nificant that respect has declined for the Supreme
Court of the United States. The Court, undeniably
the leader in the atmosphere of permissiveness
and leniency that has so irked the public, finds it-
self at an extremely low ebb in public confidence.
In a Gallup Poll reported in the Denver Post on
June 15, 1969, entitled, "Public Esteen for High
Court has Fallen in Past Six Years", the following
question was asked:
"In general, what kind of rating would you
give the Supreme Court-excellent, good, fair,
or poor?"
uLest there be any cries of "backlash" it should be
noted that both surveys included Negroes as well as
whites and the Gallup Poll cited specifically found that
the views of Negroes differed very little from those of
whites with regard to the harshness or leniency of the
courts.
"The latest results based on interviews with
1,515 adults and the trend:
1969 % 1968 % 1967 % 1963 %
Excellent .............. 8 8 15 10
Good ................. 25 28 39 33
Fair .................. 31 32 29 26
Poor .................. 23 21 17 15
No opinion ............ 13 11 9 16"
The analysis of the poll gave reasons for the de-
dine:
"An important factor behind the Court's de-
dine in public favor, as judged by the views
expressed in surveys, is the growing feeling
that the Court is 'too soft' on criminals.
Others complain that the rights of the indi-
vidual are being protected at the expense of
society as a whole. Another fairly large group
argues that the Court's role should be one of
'interpreting' rather than 'making' laws".
The conclusion from these polls is inescapable;
in the field of law and order the public is ex-
tremely dissatisfied with the present status; yet,
the discontent appears to be amorphous. It seems
safe to predict that if the same persons sampled
were asked to define just how the individual was
being protected at the expense of society, they
would be unable to do so.
Although the public definitely feels that the
police are being hindered in their efforts to com-
bat crime by restrictive court decisions, it is up to
the police to take the next step and tell the public
specifically how they are being hampered.
Associate Justice Byron White of the Supreme
Court of the United States, in a recent speech,
called for public scrutiny of Court decisions say-
mg:
"Judicial review should be carefully watched
by the public because in this country, it is the
people who form the government and make
the laws".1 2
The difficulty with this recommendation, how-
ever, is that no matter how carefully the citizen
"watches" the decision of the Court, it is the ef-
fects of the decisions themselves that are of para-
2 From a speech at Adams State College, Alamosa,
Colorado on August 5, 1969 as reported by the Denver
Post of August 6, 1969.
1970]
FRANK CARRINGTON
mount importance. The area of criminal law is far
from a simple one, and the effects of decisions of-
ten are not readily apparent; it is here that the
duty falls upon the police. They are the ones di-
rectly affected by the decisions, and they are the
ones who must speak out and assess for the public
the effects of the decisions.
In actuality, the police are the only experts in
this country in the areas of combating crime. Law
professors, judges, sociologists, and others may be
experts in areas of the broader field of Criminal
Justice; only the police, however, know the day to
day problems of being "on the street". This ex-
pertise should not be cast off lightly and, the
benefit of this expertise should not be withheld
from the public. The average citizen cannot realize
the problems of fighting crime unless the police
make these problems known to the citizen in the
context of police expertise gained in fighting crime.
In addition to the public duty to speak out, the
policeman owes a two-fold duty to himself to speak
out on the law as it affects his work. The first of
these self-duties is somewhat abstract: the police-
man of today is a professional and, as such, he
must constantly scrutinize his activities in order
to render the best possible service to those who de-
pend upon him for protection. If a policeman is
faced with a law or court decision that hampers
his effectiveness, he is duty bound, as a profes-
sional, to comply with the law or decision in
question. He cannot, and must not, disregard the
law or "short cut" around it. On the other hand,
however, he can and should make every effort to
make known to all concerned, the courts, the
legislatures, and the people, the fact that he is
hampered, in what way he is hampered, and what
he believes can be done about the situation. Gen-
eral grumbling about being "handcuffed", or re-
maining aloof in the "splendid isolation" scored
by Mr. Furstenburg in the quotation from his
article, are not the hallmarks of a professional. A
reasoned, articulate presentation of the difficulties
caused by the law or decision, however, is de-
manded of those who would call themselves police
professionals.
A second, and much more practical, aspect of
the policeman's duty to himself to speak out con-
cerns those areas of the law where the already
dangerous job of a policeman is made more dan-
gerous by laws or court decisions. To those who
have never been involved in the realities of police
work there are certain notions of "fair play" that
are very appealing in theory. For example, it is
very well to sit in a court room or law class and
postulate an absolute requirement that officers
must knock on a door and announce their presence
before entering forcibly to make an arrest or
search.'3 After all, does not fair play to persons in
the sanctity of their homes require no less? How-
ever, to the officer crouching in a hallway before a
door which may conceal an armed and desperate
felon the picture may appear slightly different;
a knock may be answered by a bullet. There is a
certain question, therefore, of fair play to the officer
involved also.
When an officer's safety is involved, his own
self interest should compel him to speak out on
laws or decisions that compound the risk factor for
him.' 4 Again, the question of practical experience
versus abstract theory becomes pertinent and the
policeman must communicate his experience and
expertise to those whom he asks to consider his
problems.
This then, in general terms, postulates the duty
of the police to speak out on the areas of the law
with which they are concerned. It is now time to
get down to specifics.
Four questions become immediately apparent
and the rest of this article will deal with these
questions:
1. To whom shall the police speak?
2. What shall the police speak about?
3. Will speaking out have any results?
4. Who shall do the actual speaking?
To WHOM SHALL THE POLICE SPEAK?
This is, by far, the simplest of the questions to
answer: the police should speak to anyone who will
listen. Basically, then, the police should speak to
all of the public, for no one is immune from crime,
and every citizen of this country has a vested in-
terest in how the police do their job. On a more
practical level, however, the primary targets of
police articulation should be the courts and the
legislatures, for these are the bodies who directly
NAs is required of Federal officers by 18 U.S.C.
#3109. This problem will be discussed below.
14 Speaking out on the safety of the officers is well il-
lustrated by comments by Francis J. Schaefer, the Ex-
ecutive Director of the Pennsylvania Chiefs of Police
Association before the Pennsylvania Conference of
State Trial Judges in June of 1968. As reported in Crime
Control Digest of July 3, 1968, p.7, Mr. Schaefer told
the judges that the police are opposed to "bail, re-bail,
and re-bail" and that many police officers wonder why
they must risk their lives in continually apprehending
hardened criminals who are quickly freed on bail to
commit more crimes.
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control the police through decisions and legisla-
tion.
In speaking to the courts and legislatures, of
course, the police must follow the proper pro-
cedures and utilize the proper vehicles to present
their views. The courts may be approached
through the device of amicus curiae briefs in cases
that are of vital concern to the police, and there is
really no reason why such briefs should not be
filed by police departments' 5 Another, and much
overlooked, approach to the courts is through
their general rule-making power. There is no rea-
son why a police department cannot present its
problems to a court by requesting that certain
police needs be considered and, if the court sees
fit, accommodated by the adoption of a court rule
of criminal procedure. This device has worked very
successfully in Colorado, as will be subsequently
discussed.
Legislatures are usually approached through
their various committees, and an articulate presen-
tation by a police officer who is prepared with
facts to support his position can be extremely ef-
fective. One thing is certain, if the police do not
present their point of view, no one will present it
for them; and equally certain is the fact that legis-
lation that can hamper effective police work will
be presented, and most articulately, by civil
liberties and social welfare groups.
The police should not be limited, however, to
formalized presentations before committees. The
word "lobby" is not a dirty word when applied to
law enforcement; and, providing they stay within
the bounds of legality, the police should not be
prevented from lobbying in the sense that lobby-
ing means presenting their point of view to indi-
vidual legislators.'
The truism, "In unity, there is strength" applies
to dealing with legislatures. In the spring of 1969,
at the urging of Chief George Seaton of the Denver
Police Department, the Colorado Law Enforce-
ment Legislative Council was formed. This Coun-
cil is an attempt to unify the law enforcement ap-
15 In September of 1969, the Denver Police Depart-
ment in conjunction with the Colorado Attorney Gen-
eral filed an amicus curiae brief with the U.S. Supreme
Court in support of the California Attorney General's
petition for re-hearing in the case of Chimel v. Cali-
fornia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). This will be discussed be-
low.
16 The Denver Police Department has two officers as
full time lobbyists at the Colorado Legislature while
that body is in session. These men deal with police
"welfare" legislation such as pensions, working condi-
tions, etc., but they also concern themselves with legis-
lation dealing with the criminal laws.
proach to the legislature. The Council consists of
three police chiefs, three sheriffs, and the Chief of
the Colorado Highway Patrol. The purposes of the
Council are, first, to arrive at a consensus in the
law enforcement community as to what legislation
is needed, and as to what legislation should be
opposed; once this consensus is reached, the
Council will present its views to the legislature
and, on occasion, to the public. This is the sort of
coordinated speaking out that can be highly ef-
fective and contributes to the overall profes-
sionalism of law enforcement in Colorado.
In speaking out to the public, articulation can be
as varied as the situation calls for; and, in certain
cases, only a direct approach to the public, as a
whole, will suffice to present facts that the people
have a right to know. This can be illustrated by
events that transpired in Denver in March of
1969. West High School erupted into a full scale
riot, and naturally the police were deeply in-
volved in containing the resultant violence. When
matters finally settled down, the Denver Police
received high praise for the way they conducted
themselves, and the school situation returned to
relative calm. One aspect of the disturbances, how-
ever, had not been brought to the attention of the
public: the cost in actual dollars, and the loss of
police protection generally, due to the diversion of
manpower to cover the school riot.
Chief Seaton of the Denver Police Department,
a highly articulate person, spoke out forcefully on
this matter at a press conference and in news re-
leases. His statements are worth quoting:
"In the recent protest demonstrations at
West High School, it was necessary to commit
the entire complement of personnel and equip-
ment of the Denver Police Department to this
demonstration, either actively assigned or on
a stand-by basis.
"This resulted in an expenditure of funds
that, at this time, and our total analysis is
not complete, has amounted to nearly twenty-
five thousand dollars.
"A few of our expenditures are explained
thusly:
Seventeen police officers assaulted, injured
and hospitalized.
Twenty-five police vehicles damaged, some
extensively.
Damage to private property in this area,
-and damage to West High School.
Overtime to be paid to more than eighty
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police officers-and many other costs not
listed.
"For the four days, March twentieth,
twenty-first, twenty-second, and twenty-
third, crime increased by twenty-two point
three percent as compared to the previous
week-end.
"Denver is experiencing an increase in
crime in 1969 which is about ten percent
above the national average. To deplete our
police forces to matters other than crime,
seriously hampers our ability to cope with an
ever-increasing and efficient criminality, and
to respond to calls for police assistance from
citizens of our community".
1j 7
This is the type of information that the public
has every right to know; it is the type of informa-
tion that the police have a duty to supply. This is
speaking out to the public in its truest sense; this
is not generalized grumbling by the police at law-
breakers as a whole, but rather a detailed report
to the people of just what four days of lawlessness
cost them.
Thus, the question as to whom the police should
speak resolves itself to this: the police must ad-
dress the courts and law making bodies, but they
must also "take their case to the people" as did
the Denver Police Department.
WHAT SHALL Tm PoicE SPEAK ABOUT?
We turn now to specifics. In this section, ex-
amples will be given on some areas of the law that
affect the police and the way they do their jobs so
completely and so fundamentally that there can
be no question of the necessity for articulation of
the practical problems involved. The examples
used in this section are by no means exhaustive;
they should suffice to show, however, the huge
chasm between the law in the abstract and the
law as it is applied in actuality. The point to be
made by these examples is that these are prob-
lems that only the police, who deal with the
realities of the matter, can recognize and speak
about.
Court Decisions
The case of Chinel v. California,) decided by
the United States Supreme Court on the last day
of the October, 1968 term is one that should make
17 Press release by George L. Seaton, Chief of Police,
Denver, Colorado issued March 25, 1969.
18395 U.S. 752 (1969)
even the most lethargic policeman wish to speak
out; for in this case, the Court delivered an opinion
that evidenced a complete and utter disregard of
the practical problems that a policeman must face
in attempting to do his job. Chimel is a classic ex-
ample of a decision that might have been basically
sound, if confined to its facts, but which, instead,
is written in such sweeping language that it goes far
beyond its facts and presents the police, who must
follow the decision in the myriad situations that
arise on the street, with no clear guidelines as to
what they may or may not do. This is the kind of
decision about which the police must speak out.
Let us look at Chimel from a practical point of
view. The facts of the case are simple. The police
in Santa Ana, California went to the house of Ted
Steven Chime119 in the late afternoon of September
13, 1965 to arrest him, with an arrest warrant,20
for the burglary of a coin shop. The arrest warrant
was issued at 10:30 A.M. that morning. Without
going into detail, it is sufficient to say that a thor-
ough search of Chimel's house was made, incident
to his arrest, and the coins taken in the burglary
were found. At Chimel's trial, these coins were
introduced into evidence and he was convicted.
His conviction was upheld in the California Dis-
trict Court of Appealn and the California Su-
preme Court.22 The California Supreme Court re-
lied on United Staes v. Rabinowilz,u to sustain the
arrest-based search which revealed the coins. The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.Y
In a 6-2 opinion, written by Justice Potter
Stewart, the Court reversed Chimel's conviction,
overruling Rabinowitz and overturning nineteen
years of its own precedent1 5 The Court laid down a
29 The name of the defendant in this case may be the
most mispronounced in the history of Supreme Court
jurisprudence. The Los Angeles District Attorney's
office advises that it is pronounced "chi-mel" as doorbell
chimes.
20 The arrest warrant was concededly defective under
the California Supreme Court case of People v. Sesslin,
68 Cal. 2d. 413, 67 Cal. Rptr. 409, 439 P. 2d 321,
(1968); however, in upholding Chimel's conviction, the
California Supreme Court held that the arrest was law-
ful because, at the time of the arrest, the officers had
probable cause to arrest Chimel, independent of the
warrant. People v. Chimel, 68 Cal. 2d 436, 439, P. 2d
333, 67 Cal. Rptr. 421, (1968). The U.S. Supreme Court
assumed without deciding that this holding was correct.
395 U.S. 752, 755.
2161 Cal. Rptr. 714.
2168 Cal. 2d. 436, 439 P. 2d. 333, 67 Cal. Rptr. 421,
(1968).339 U.S. 56 (1950).
24 393 U.S. 958 (1968).21 Ex-Justice Fortas did not participate in the de-
cision. Justices Black and White dissented. Justice Har-
lan concurred specially.
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new rule dealing with searches of premises in-
cident to a lawful arrest. Such searches may en-
compass only:
"... the area 'within [the arrestee's] im-
mediate control'--construing that phrase to
mean the area from within which he might
gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence" 6
Justice Stewart further held:
"There is no comparable justification, how-
ever for routinely searching rooms other than
that in which an arrest occurs--or, for that
matter, for searching through all the desk
drawers or other closed or concealed areas in
that room itself. Such searches in the absence
of well recognized exceptions may be made
only under the authority of a search war-
rant"?.
Thus, with one stroke, the right of the police to
make searches of the premises incident to a lawful
arrest disappears.
The language used by the Court is the broadest
possible, and it far exceeds the exigencies of the
case, for in the Chimel case itself the police had
ample time to obtain a search warrant.2 Had
Chinel been based on this point the police would
at least have some guideline to go by; the Court
could have spoken loud and clear "When there is
time to get a search warrant, you must get one!" 2
Now, after Chimel, each warrantless search of
the premises, where an arrest is made, must be
confined to the area within the arrestee's "im-
mediate control". But where are the guidelines
for the police? Chimel provides no guidelines at
all. Every judge who is called upon to review police
action can make of it what he willl And the officer
26395 U.S. 752, 763.
27Id.
2 From 10:30 A.M. when the arrest warrant was
procured until "late afternoon" according to the facts.
29 Even such a clear-cut, mandate as this would raise
the problem of courts constantly, "second-guessing" the
police as to whether there was, in fact, time to get a
warrant. See La Fave, Search and Seizure, "The Course
of True Law... Has Not... Run Smooth" 1966 U. ILL.
LAW FoRum 255 at 298-299. (1966)
00 Courts, now, cannot even agree as to whether or not
to give retroactive effect to Chimnd. The United States
Supreme Court neatly sidestepped this issue in Von
Cleef v. New Jersey 395 U.S. 814 (1969). Several Courts
have denied retroactivity to Chimel including two fed-
eral Circuits: CA 2 in U.S. v. Bennett, 6 Cr L 2016
(9/9/69); and CA 5 in Lyon v. U.S., 6 Cr L 2055
(9/4/69). Also, the California Supreme Court: People
who must make his split-second decisions on the
street literally cannot know whether he is acting
constitutionally or not.
Consider further the following language used by
Justice Stewart with regard to when the Chimel
rule applies:
"Such searches, in the absence of well rec-
ognized exceptions, may be made only under
the authority of a search warrant". (emphasis
added)"
The sentence about well-recognized exceptions is
footnoted:
"8. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357-358".
A trip to the pages cited in Katz, a case prohibiting
warrantless eavesdropping, does not elicit these
exceptions except as they are held not applicable
to electronic eavesdropping. Indeed, one finds on
page 357 a reiteration of the principle that searches
without prior judicial approval are unreasonable
"subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions". This language is
again footnoted so that we finally get to the excep-
tions. The footnote in Katz states:
"19. See e.g. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 153, 156; McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451, 454-456; Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 174-177; Cooper v. California,
386 U.S. 58; Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
298-300".
Of these cases, Carroll, Brinegar, and Cooper
deal with searches of automobiles; 2 McDonald
v. Edwards; 6 Cr L 2024, (9/24/69); yet the Alaska
Supreme Court awards it retroactivity. Fresanada v.
State 5 Cr L 2460. (8/27/69)
u1395 U.S. 752 763.
2 In the area of searches of automobiles, we again re-
turn to footnotes. In Chimel, in footnote 9, Justice
Stewart writes: "Our holding today of course is entirely
consistent with the recognized principle that, assuming
the existence of probable cause, automobiles and other
vehicles may be searched without warrants, 'where it is
not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle
can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought'. Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 135; see Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160.395 U.S. 752." This would seem to carve
out an exception to Chimel in the case of automobiles;
yet the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals suppressed evi-
dence seized from a vehicle incident to an arrest in
Colosimo v. Perini, 6 Cr L 2041, (9/17/69). The Court
relied on Chimel and Preston v. United States, 376 U.S.
364, cited in Chimel.
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deals with "exigent circumstances"; and, Warden
v. Hayden deals with "hot pursuit". Chimel over-
rules nineteen years of what had been acceptable
police practice; then, by way of "guidelines" gives
a footnote to a footnote. Is there any wonder that
the average police officer with a high-school educa-
tion or a few years of college might be confused?
Justice John Marshall Harlan concurred in
Chimel with reservations. He said:
"The only thing that has given me pause in
voting to overrule Harris and Rabinowitz is
that as a result of Mapp v. Ohio, and Ker v.
California... every change in Fourth Amend-
ment law must now be obeyed by state officials
facing widely different problems of local law
enforcement. We simply do not know the ex-
tent to which cities and towns across the na-
tion are prepared to administer the greatly
expanded warrant system which will be re-
quired by today's decision; nor can we say
with assurance that in each and every local
situation, the warrant requirement plays an
essential role in the protection of those funda-
mental liberties protected against state in-
fringement by the Fourteenth Amendment". 3
Let us now look at some of the situations in
which the broad wording of the Chimel opinion plus
its lack of guidelines for the police make Justice
Harlan's reservations truly prophetic. These are
the situations about which the police must be-
come vocal.
The Safety of the Policeman
Justice Stewart recognized in Chimel that there
is a danger to the police from weapons in the im-
mediate area of the arrestee, but he ignored the
fact that weapons in other portions of the premises
may be equally dangerous if the arrestee or others
on the premises can get to them. Consider this hy-
pothetical situation:
Two officers receive a tip that a man wanted
for murder by shooting is at his brother's
house; he may leave at any time, so the offi-
cers go right to the house and arrest the sus-
pect in the living room. The suspect is on the
sofa when the officers enter; upon seeing
them, he starts across the room in the general
direction of a desk. The officers grab him,
handcuff him, and replace him on the sofa.
- 395 U.S. 752, 769.
Justice Stewart has stated in Chinel, that the
officers cannot lawfully search the desk across the
room; but, what if the suspect's brother is present?
The officers may feel that there is a weapon in the
desk, and they may fear that the brother of the
suspect may go after it. But what if they do check
the desk for weapons? If they find the gun, they
have protected themselves from the possibility of
being shot; but, in doing so, they may have vio-
lated the Chimel rule, at least if that case is con-
strued strictly against them. Further, suppose
that the gun in the desk is the weapon that was
used in the murder for which they have arrested
the suspect. By protecting themselves, they have left
themselves open to have the murder weapon suppressed
because they exceeded the Chimel arrest-based search
limiation.
As a matter of fact, experienced officers are not
going to take a chance that other persons beside
the arrestee on the premises are harmless. The
officers will protect themselves, as they have a
perfect right to do. At the same time, however, the
very language used by Justice Stewart in describ-
ing a lawful Chimel search makes the officer im-
peril the case against the criminal when he acts to
prevent a peril to his own safety.
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals, in in-
terpreting Chimel, has taken an eminently practi-
cal view by enunciating the "lunge" doctrine,
Scott v. State.u In that case, the Maryland Court
extended the searchable area under Chinel to ex-
tend beyond mere "arms length" into that area
where the suspect could lunge to obtain a weapon
or destructible evidence. This decision was doubt-
less predicated in large measure by concern for the
officers' safety." There is no assurance, however,
that all reviewing courts would take such a re-
alistic view or that this extension would be ap-
proved by the Supreme Court. Moreover, even the
Scott case does not cover the situation where other
parties who might attack the officers are present.
Riots and Civil Disorders
In the area of riots and civil disorders the Chimel
restrictions on arrest-based searches, if interpreted
34 Md. Court of Special Appeals, 5 Cr.L. 2426,
(8/21/69).
35 Another example of a court construing Chimel with
the officers safety in mind is State v. Moody, Missouri
Supreme Court, 5 Cr. L 3131, (July 1969). In upholding
a traffic arrest-based search of an automobile, the court
noted, with respect to the officers safety: "We believe
that police officers, while in the performance of their
duties, are entitled to all the safety and protection we
can give them within constitutional limitations."
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literally, could result in a situation whereby officers
working under the stress of riot conditions could
find themselves "second-guessed" by courts re-
viewing their actions at a later date in much less
harrowing circumstances:
Officers under fire on the street pinpoint a
suspected window from which shots are being
fired. They enter and arrest the lone occupant
of the apartment from which the shots ema-
nated. They seize a rifle from him. Now, how
much further may they go?
Surely, not even the broadest application of the
Chimel rule would preclude a check of the rooms in
the apartment for other potential snipers, but,
what about a careful search of the apartment for a
cache of arms and ammunition? Clearly, there
would be probable cause to search for further
weapons; and, equally clearly, a Police Depart-
ment that has committed its forces to the street in
a riot situation has no time to procure search war-
rants. But what if a carefully concealed cache of
arms and ammunition is discovered in a closet in a
room other than that in which the suspect was
arrested? Ought this evidence to be suppressed be-
cause the warrantless search violated Chimel's
mandate?
In the riot type situation presented above, a
prosecutor could argue, of course, that the search
for weapons or other evidence is justified as one of
the "well recognized exceptions", mentioned by
Justice Stewart. Such an exception might be the
'ot pursuit" doctrine of Warden v. Hayden, 6
which permitted the warrantless search of the
house of a robbery suspect when the police had
entered the house within minutes of the com-
mission of the crime. Another argument that could
be advanced would be the "exigent circumstances"
doctrine of McDonald v. United StatesP
Despite the foregoing possibilities regarding ex-
ceptions to the warrant rule a court that was so
inclined could find ample justification in the
Chimel opinion, as written, to second guess the
police and supress even weapons seized during the
height of a civil disorderPn Supreme Court guide-
,6 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
- 385 U.S. 451 (1948).
8 This is not far-fetched. Some appelate courts, ap-
parently from fear of being reversed by higher courts,
interpret decisions like Chimel most strictly against the
police. An excellent example of such an interpretation
is State v. Paul, New Mexico Court of Appeals, 5 Cr. L
2406, (8/8/69). In the Paul case, the court held that
Chimel required that the seizure of items, discovered
lines for the conduct of officers, other than in a
footnote twice removed from the text of the opin-
ion, could prevent such a construction.
Local Search and Seizure Restrictions
There may be many cases in which local search
and seizure restrictions, when read together with
Chimel, can result in the frustration of the police
in their efforts to obtain admissible evidence. Two
examples of such restrictions may be cited:
in the course of a lawful search under a warrant but not
named in the warrant, be held invalid. The Paul court
reasoned that since Chimel overruled Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) with regard to arest-based
searches, Chimel also overruled that part of Harris
which has been construed as permitting the seizure of
items not named in a warrant. The question of the seiz-
ure of items not named in the warrant is not discussed
in Chimel; and Harris is expressly overruled only inso-
far as the principles of Harris inconsistent with those
discussed in Chimel are concerned. Nevertheless, the
Paul court has extended Chimel to this length thereby
restricting police conduct to a greater degree than Chi-
mel demanded.
Another example of a court taking the broad lan-
guage of Chimel to its logical conclusion arose in Dade
County, Florida. Mr. Howard Levine, Legal Advisor to
the Dade County Department of Public Safety advised
of just such a holding. He summarized the case as fol-
lows:
"On October 18, 1969 at approximately 2:40
A.M. in an area of unincorporated Dade County,
Florida, in which rapes of white females had
occurred on the previous Friday nights, a police
officer was accompanying a lone white female to her
house. As he crossed the back yard of an apartment
building with her, he had occasion to look into a
ground floor apartment in the building. He ob-
served four white males smoking homemade-type
cigarettes in the manner characteristic of the mari-juana smoker. Also, a fifthl white male was inject-
ing a substance into the arm of a Negro male. In
addition, the police officer, who had been trained in
narcotics, smelled the distinctive odor of marijuana
coming through an open fan vent measuring ap-
proximately three feet by three feet.
'Based upon this information, the Dade County
Police Legal Advisor authorized the officer to enter
the premises pursuant to the emergency doctrine
and on the separate theories that both a felony was
being committed in the officer's presence and that
the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that
the evidence of that felony was being destroyed.
Obtaining a search warrant would have been im-
practical.
"After the officers had entered and secured the
premises and had properly advised all the subjects
of their Constitutional rights, each of the subjects
individually admitted to possessing and smoking
marijuana.
"On November 25, 1969, a judge of the Criminal
Court of Record of Dade County ordered the evi-
dence seized suppressed on the grounds that the
officers had failed to obtain a search warrant."
The police officer involved in this case would be
well within his rights to ask "What's the use?"
FRANK CARINGTON
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rule 41, prohibits the execution of a search
warrant at night unless the supporting affi-
davit is positive the property sought is on the
premises to be searched. It is not difficult to
imagine a situation in which a federal officer
would be faced with a situation, at night, in
which he had probable cause for a search war-
rant but was unable to make a positive state-
ment to support a nighttime search.39 If the
officer could be sure that the evidence would
remain on the premises he could wait until
morning and get a "daytime" search warrant.
Suppose, however, that the evidence was of a
consumable or destructible type which could
easily be disposed of by use or sale. Prior to
Chimel an arrest-based search would have
been permissible; now, the officer is faced with
the choice of seizing evidence which may be
suppressed as obtained in violation of the
Chimne rule; or, taking a very real chance that
his evidence will be disposed of during the
night.
The Arizona Statute, concerning search war-
rants,40 to use another example, does not
authorize a search warrant to issue for mere
evidence. Suppose officers arrest a rape-mur-
derer in the living room of his home. They may
have ample probable cause to believe that the
suspect's bloody underclothes are concealed
in the house; but, the underclothes constitute
mere evidence so no search warrant can be
issued for them.
Assuming a consent search is refused, the
combination of Chimel which prevents an
arrest-based search of the house, and the local
search warrant limitation may have created
a situation whereby this vital evidence be-
comes immune from seizure.
In Chimel the majority of the court did not con-
cern itself with the possible practical effects of the
broad language of Chitnel running head-on into
local restrictions; but, the policeman who is
caught between the Chimel opinion and his local
restrictions is definitely concerned. Again, only a
39 Until recently, the requirement of a "positive"
affidavit for a nighttime search was the rule in Colorado
(C.R.C.P. Rule 41). This has been changed, put prior
to the change, many cases were personally observed by
the author in which facts establishing probable cause
would not be sufficiently "positive" to support a night-
time search warrant.10Arizona Revised Statutes 13-1442
few words of guidelines could have alleviated these
problems.
Unavailability of a Magistrate to Issue a Search
Warrant
There are areas in this country where a search
warrant cannot be procured for hours or days be-
cause no magistrate is available to issue the war-
rant:
Aspen, Colorado is a mountain resort com-
munity with only one county judge in resi-
dence to issue search warrants. If this judge is
unavailable, the next nearest town is forty-
two miles away. If the mountain roads are
snowbound this round trip to procure a war-
rant may take many hours. Often, in winter
the roads are not passable at all. Mr. Michael
Fitzgerald, the Deputy District Attorney in
Aspen has documented cases in which the un-
availability of a magistrate to issue a search
warrant has resulted in officers being frus-
trated in their attempts to recover evidence
due to the fact that the evidence has been
consumed while the warrant was being sought.
Here again, the broad language of Chimel can
stand as an insurmountable barrier.
Other Persons on the Premises
The problem raised by the presence of persons,
other than the arrestee, being on the premises
where an arrest has taken place is probably the
most perplexing problem for the police that Chimel
has raised. Justice White in his dissent in the
Chimel case pointed up this problem.' He discussed
the fact that Chimel's wife was present when
Chimel was arrested and the likelihood that she
would have removed the coins in question if the
officers had left to procure a search warrant. Justice
White then went on to point out that even if an
officer had been left on the premises serious prob-
lems are presented. Concerning the officer who
remains behind to guard the house he noted:
"However, if he not only could have remained
in the home against petitioners wife's will, but
followed her about to assure that no evidence
was being tampered with, the invasion of her
privacy would be almost as great as that ac-
companying an actual search. Moreover, had
41395 U.S. 752, 775.
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the wife summoned an accomplice, one offi-
cer could not have watched them both"A
The majority in Chimel blandly ignores the rea-
soning expressed by Justice White. In so doing,
they typify their general disregard for the practi-
cal consequences of their decision as regards the
working policeman on the scene.
Two cases that arose in Denver in the Summer
of 1969, after Chimel was decided further illustrate
the practical aspect of the problem that Chimel
has created for the police:
Both of the Denver cases involve homi-
cides; in both cases the police had arrested one
suspect who told them where a second sus-
pect could be found. In both cases, there was
no time to get a search warrant prior to the
arrest of the second suspect, because of the
possibility of flight of the latter.
These suspects were arrested in their re-
spective houses, and no arrest-based search
for the murder weapon was made. Friends or
relatives of the suspects were present in both
of the houses where the arrests were made;
these persons had ample opportunity to get
rid of the murder weapons while the police
procured a search warrant; and, when the
search warrant was finally procured the mur-
der weapon was not found. The author was
personally involved in each of the cases.
In one case we know that the friends of the
defendant removed the murder weapon be-
cause the defendant told us that the weapon
was on the premises when he was arrested.
In the second case, we cannot be sure that
the mother of the defendant removed the
murder weapon itself. We do know, from her
own admission, that she removed at least one
gun from the premises while the search war-
rant was being procured.
These two cases are concrete examples of the
frustrating effects of the Chimel restrictions upon
what was otherwise excellent and genuine effort.
The very situation which Justice White's dissent
predicted would arise, did actually arise in these
two cases; and the lack of effective guidelines for
the police caused the loss of valuable evidence.
Former Justice Tom C. Clark has summed up
the critical need of the police for such guidelines:
42 395 U.S. 752, 775 N. 5.
"Every moment of every day, somewhere in the
United States, a law enforcement officer is faced
with the problem of search and seizure. He is
anxious to obey the rules that circumscribe his
conduct in this field. It is the duty of this Court to
lay down those rules with such clarity and under-
standing that he may be able to follow them." ,3
In a brief filed by the Denver Police Depart-
ment and the Colorado Attorney General urging
the Supreme Court to grant a rehearing in the
Chimel case, the above described cases in Denver
were presented to the Court as examples of the
need for guidelines. The Court denied a rehearing.
However, at least an attempt was made by the
police to speak out to the Court.
From the foregoing examples, it should be clear
that valid police procedures have been restricted
by the Chirnel case. Moreover, it should be obvious
that the thwarting effect of decisions such as
Chinel upon police effectiveness will only be
aired if the police themselves air them. The av-
erage citizen, or even the average judge or law-
maker is not going to analyze cases such as Chimel
to ascertain their effects on the police. It is for the
police, rather, to make this analysis and make
their findings known.
Chimel is far from the only case in which the
holding, extending far beyond what the facts of
the case required, can cause problems for the police
which were either not forseen, or, worse, which
were disregarded by the Court. Turning from the
area of search incident to arrest, let us look at
another restrictive Supreme Court decision in the
search and seizure area.
Davis v. Mississippi,M decided by the Supreme
Court on April 22, 1969, is another "sleeper" in-
sofar as the police are concerned; and another ex-
ample of why the police should speak out on the
problems that the Court's decisions can and do
create.
Davis is a classic example of the truism that
"bad facts make bad law". On concededly "bad
facts", the Court in a 6-2 decision reversed the
rape conviction of one John Davis.4 In so doing,
the Court ruled, sweepingly, that investigative
detention for the purpose of fingerprinting, in the
3Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 at 622,
dissenting opinion (1961).44394 U.S. 721 (1969).
41 Ex-Justice Fortas did not participate in the de-
cision. The maliority opinion, written by justice Bren-
nan, was joined by the Chief justice and justices White,
Marshal, and Douglas. Justice Harlan concurred spec-
ially. Justices Black and Stewart dissented.
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absence of probable cause for arrest, is a Fourth
Amendment violation and that fingerprints taken
pursuant to such a detention may not be used in
evidence.
The facts of the Davis case are important in
order to point out the disparity between the fact
situation and the scope of the opinion. John
Davis, a fourteen year old Negro youth was con-
victed in Mississippi of the rape of an elderly
white woman. He was sentenced to life imprison-
ment. Upon appeal to the Mississippi Supreme
Court, his conviction was affirmed,"1 the U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari" and reversed
his conviction.
The rape of the victim in the Davis case took
place on December 2, 1965 in her home. The victim
described her assailant merely as a Negro youth;
the only other clues found were finger and palm
prints on the window where the rapist apparently
entered. During the next ten days, the police en-
gaged in "dragnet" or mass roundup tactics to a
large extent. They brought to the police station
about twenty-four Negro youths for interrogation
and fingerprinting; Davis was one of this group.
The police also interrogated some forty or fifty
others concerning the rape. Davis was finger-
printed on December 3 as part of this roundup.
On December 12, Davis was arrested (concededly
without a warrant or probable cause); and, in the
course of this arrest, his fingerprints were taken
on December 14. The December 14 prints were
identified by the F.B.I. as matching the prints in
the victim's house.
At Davis' trial, the December 14 prints were
admitted into evidence over his objections that
they were the product of an unlawful detention.
The Mississippi Supreme Court sustained the
admission of the fingerprint evidence on the
theory that it was of such a trustworthy nature
that Fourth Amendment proscriptions on unrea-
sonable searches and seizures do not apply." This
finding, however, was rejected by the United
States Supreme Court, citing a 1958 Circuit Court
of Appeals decision, Bynumn v. United States.49 The
Court held that fingerprint evidence is no excep-
tion to the rule of Mapp v. Ohio,"0 that all evidence
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is
46 204 So. 2d 270 (1967).
4 393 U.S. 821 (1968).
48 This was the point put forward by Justice Stewart
in his dissent.
4 104 U.S. App. D.C. 368, 262 F. 2d 465, (C.A.D.C.
1958).
50 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
inadmissible; that detentions for the sole purpose
of fingerprinting, in the absence of an arrest war-
rant or probable cause, are unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment; and that evidence re-
sulting therefrom is inadmissible in any court.
Applying this rule to the facts in Davis the Court
said:
1) The December 14 prints were inadmissible
because, as was conceded by the State of
Mississippi, the December 12 arrest, which
was the source of the December 14 prints,
was without probable cause.
2) The December 3 prints were also inad-
missible because Davis was brought in for
fingerprinting, along with twenty-three
others, as a part of a generalized roundup,
and this "investigatory detention", in the
absence of judicial approval resulted in a
Fourth Amendment violation.
Hence, neither set of prints could be used in
evidence against Davis and his conviction must be
reversed.
Justice Hugo Black wrote a stinging dissent,
one of his best. He deplored the majority's expan-
sion of the Fourth Amendment saying:
"This case is but one more in an ever-expand-
ing list of cases in which this Court has been
so widely blowing up the Fourth Amendment's
scope that its original authors would be hard
put to recognize their creation"."
Thus, we see the Court again making sweeping
generalizations in the law. of search and seizure
that the police must be forced to live with. Had
the Court reversed Davis' conviction, on the facts5 2
of the case, there would be little reason to quarrel
with the result. Roundup tactics are unprofessional
and should not be used by the police. However,
the Court laid down a blanket proscription of the
use of fingerprints taken in an arrest without
61394 U.S. 721, dissenting opinion. Justice Black also
dissented in Chimel v. California, supra.
62 Justice Harlan came closer to holding the case to its
facts than anyone in the majority in his concurring
opinion. He concurred with the result in Davis, but,
said:
"There may be circumstances, falling short of
the "dragnet" procedures employed in this case,
where compelled submission to fingerprinting
would not amount to a violation of the Fourth
Amendment even in the absence of a warrant, and
I would leave that question open". 394 U.S. 721,
concurring opinion.
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probable cause or those taken incident to "in-
vestigatory detention". What this means to the
working policeman is that in cases where finger-
prints are a critical item of evidence, he may be
forced to arrest "at his peril"--because, if, in a
case where the question of probable cause is a
dose one, he is "second guessed" by the judge re-
garding the arrest, then he has lost one of the
prosecution's most vital items of evidence. More-
over, Davis creates very real practical problems in
those cases where unidentified fingerprints are
found and there are several suspects but probable
cause is lacking to arrest any of them.
On the latter point, Justice Brennan, who
authored the Davis opinion, suggested that a
Constitutional procedure might be set up whereby
a suspect could be compelled to submit to finger-
printing, in the absence of probable cause, pro-
viaed judicial approval was first secured. Following
that suggestion, such a procedure has been adopted
by the Colorado Supreme Courtn and this de-
velopment will be subsequently discussed in de-
tail. Few, if any, other states, however, have
adopted this procedure; so the problem presented
by the unidentified fingerprint cases is still very
real to many police departments, and to the public
at large.
Let us now consider two examples of the un-
identified fingerprint problem, based upon actual
cases that happened in Denver, after Davis was
decided, but before this judicially approved finger-
printing procedure was adopted in Colorado.
In the first case, a young girl was found
murdered in Denver. Her body was found in
the apartment where she lived alone. In the
kitchen were found two glasses partially full
of beer; one bore the victim's fingerprints,
one bore a set of unknown prints. The finger-
prints were the only dues. The police checked
the girl's background and learned that she
had a number of boyfriends. They naturally
had to be checked out as prime suspects in
the killing, but there were no witnesses or any
other evidence sufficient to satisfy the require-
ments of probable cause to arrest any of the
boyfriends. Some of the suspects had police
records, and the Denver Police files were
checked in those instances. These suspects
were cleared. However, at least five of the
suspects' prints were not in the Denver files.
6 Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 41.1,
"Court Order for Fingerprinting".
The detectives assigned to the case could
not compel the remaining suspects to submit
to fingerprinting because of the rule in the
Davis case, yet they were afraid to ask the
suspects to submit to fingerprinting because
they might "tip their hand" to the real killer,
that is they might let him know he was under
suspicion. By now, most of the suspects have
left town, and, as of this writing, the killing
is unsolved.
In the second case a daytime house burglary
was committed in Denver. The victimized
house was near a school. A neighbor had seen
two teenagers, both of whom she knew, in the
yard of the burgled house about noon, but she
thought nothing of it because the kids lived
in the neighborhood and quite possibly were
going home for lunch from the nearby school.
Fingerprints on the window sill were the only
dues. Naturally, the youths seen in the yard
were under suspicion; but, the facts did not
constitute probable cause to arrest them.
Davis again bars compelling them to be finger-
printed; and, if they were asked to submit,
and refused, they would be alerted to the fact
that they were suspects. If, in fact, they were
guilty parties, they would have ample time to
get rid of the stolen property. The burglary is
unsolved.
These examples illustrate an all too frequent
situation that the police encounter. They have
fingerprints at a crime scene and they have sus-
pects; however, in the absence of probable cause
to arrest the suspect, there is no way of connect-
ing the suspect with the fingerprints---assuming
the suspect's prints are not in the police depart-
ment files. The foregoing examples do not involve
mass round-ups as was true in the Davis case; yet,
the sweeping language in Davis effectively barred
the solution of cases of the type illustrated. The
point to be made here, about Davis, is that, as in
Chimel, the majority of the Court did not con-
sider" these very real practical problems that the
police must face. Instead, we have a mass round-
up situation translated into a blanket prohibition
on "investigative detention" even though other
51 It should be noted that Justice Harlan who was a
majority Justice in both Davis and Chimel did, in fact,
consider the practical problems involved, at least as is




cases, falling far short of the dragnet procedures
in Davis, may be adversely affected."
Of equal importance to the police is the aspect
of Davis that involves a spur-of-the-moment
arrest being "second guessed" in court. Consider
this hypothetical case:
A robbery murder is committed in a store
by a bandit wearing a rubber halloween mask.
The bandit stabbed the store owner to death
and fled but left his knife, with his fingerprints
on it at the scene. One witness saw a man de-
scribed as white, of medium height, and build,
wearing a white sport shirt, blue slacks, and
loafers running from the store. No color of
hair or facial description is available because
of the mask.
Some thirty minutes after the robbery, an
officer spots a man fitting the witness' very
general description, some sixteen blocks away
from the scene of the crime. He arrests the
man, based on the description. The suspect's
fingerprints are found on the knife left at the
scene. Now, suppose, at the trial of the case,
the officer should be second-guessed by the
judge as to his probable cause to arrest the sus-
pect. This could easily happen. An arrest based
on such a general description would present a
very close question. If the judge rules that the
description was too general and therefore there
was not probable cause to arrest the suspect;
the fingerprint evidence must be suppressed
under Davis' broad mandate. If so, the case is
lost and the robber-murderer must be freed.
Under the facts of the foregoing hypothetical
case, there is no round-up as there was in Davis,
rather such a case would be a stellar example of
alert, efficient police work, yet, it would seem that
11 For an excellent discussion on the need for and duty
of the police to make investigative detentions in some
cases see: Fisher, Laws of Arrest, Sec. 34, "Detention
Incident to Investigation of Crime" P. 61. (Traffic In-
stitute of Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.,
1967). The Supreme Court has had before it another
case involving "investigative detention" in another con-
text. In Morales v. New York, 22 N.Y. 2d 55, 238 N.E.
2d 307, 1968, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed
the murder conviction of Morales over his claim that
his confession (given after the proper advisements were
made) was the product of a detention without prob-
able cause. Certiorari was granted on the question: "Do
state enforcement officials have authority to temporar-
ily detain and question properly warned suspects on
less than probable cause?" (6 Cr. L. 4038) The Court
on December 8, 1969 refused to consider the question,
after argument, because of an inadequate record. (6 Cr.
L 3013)
Davis would render this police work fruitless. But
consider the dilemma of the officer who first saw
the suspect: he must act at once or he may never see
the suspect again. The officer is required to act at
his peril, however, for if his arrest is subsequently
ruled invalid, the fingerprints based on that arrest
cannot be used. If the Supreme Court even con-
sidered this problem, it made no mention of it
and certainly gave no guidelines to officers faced
with similar situations on the street.
The foregoing examples of how two Supreme
Court cases can result in immeasurably hampering
police efficiency show the need for a vocal police.
Situations such as those described can arise at any
time in any city in this country; the overbroad
language of decisions such as Davis and Chix
conflicts with the realities of fighting crime. The
realities of day to day police activities must be
stated by the police themselves; because only the
police, who experience in practice the effects of the
court decisions, are in a position to explain how the
decisions adversely affect their efficiency. More-
over, if the police do not tell their side of the
story, no one is going to do it for them!
Legislative Enactments
Turning from court decisions to legislative en-
actments, the need for police articulation can
again be shown. The men who must enforce the
laws and be guided by the laws, are the ones who
are closest to the ways the laws actually work. If
a policeman feels that he is definitely hampered by
certain laws he should speak out to the legislature
and, if necessary, to the public so that his problems
are known.
An example of a provision of the law that re-
stricts police efficiency to an alarming degree may
be found in the Colorado Children's Code dealing
with questioning of juveniles. The Code prohibits
the questioning of any juvenile (a person under
eighteen) unless a parent or guardian of the ju-
venile is present.5" This sounds fine in theory, but
presents great problems in practice. In a recent
Denver Case, four young hoodlums attacked six
youngsters with chains, bricks, and fists. One of
the victims was a 12 year old girl. Of the suspects
arrested, only one was over eighteen. The eighteen
year old was questioned and jailed. The juveniles,
two seventeen and one sixteen, had to be released
because their parents refused to come to the police
building; since there is no flexibility in the Code
65 C.R.S. 22-2-2.
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provision requiring parental presence at any
questioning, the refusal of the juveniles' parents
to appear stymied the investigation as far as the
juveniles were concerned.
This case, involving teen-age hoodlums of the
worst kind, is exactly the type of situation that the
police should bring to the attention of the public.
In this case, as it happens, the police did just that.
The detective in charge of the case advised the
newspapers of the release of the juvenile suspects
and told them just why they were releasedY5 The
public was therefore made aware of exactly how the
law relating to questioning of juveniles ties the
policeman's hands. As the attorney for the Denver
Police Department, the writer felt sufficiently
strongly about this case to request one of the news-
paper staff writers (also an attorney) to emphasize
the case of the three released hoodlums in an
article analyzing the Children's Code. The writer
agreed, and he very effectively pointed out how the
parents refusal to appear caused the three under-
age hoodlums to be released; once again bringing to
the public attention this handicapping provision
of law.5 The Denver Police will continue to obey
this provision despite the obvious handicap it
places on our investigations; but, at the same time,
we have a duty to keep the public informed of the
results of our adherence to the law.
Laws and Rules Involving the Officer's Safety
Another area of the law in which the police must
become vocal, in their own self interest, involves
provisions of the laws that increase the danger of
police work. Two such provisions of the Federal law
are illustrative of the problem. Both provisions deal
with the execution of search warrants by federal
officers; one, a statute, 9 requires officers to knock
on a door or otherwise announce their office and
purpose before entering to arrest or search; the
other, a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 0
prohibits the execution of a search warrant at
night unless the supporting affidavit is positive
that the property sought is on the premises to be
searched.
Two actual case experiences will illustrate the
& See: The Rocky Mountain News (Denver, Colo-
rado), Friday, July 18, 1969, page 66.See: The Rocky Mountain News (Denver, Colo-
rado), "Children's Code is Still Controversial Issue" by
Richard Wood, Rocky Mountain News Court Reporter.
&9 18 U.S.C. 3109.
0 F.R. Cr.P. Rule 41 (c). By statute, 18 USC 1405
(1), a search warrant based upon probable cause may
be served at any time in certain narcotic violations.
This does not apply to dangerous drugs.
effects of the above mentioned provisions as con-
stituting a threat to an officer's safety in certain
cases. Both descriptions are based on the personal
experience of the writer who participated in each
raid.
In the first case, six law enforcement
agencies participated in a narcotic raid on a
motorcycle gang in January of 1969 in Gilpin
County, Colorado. Surveillance of the house
which was raided indicated that the occupants
constantly carried side arms, rifles, and shot-
guns inside the house and on the premises.
It was anticipated that twelve to eighteen
persons would be in the house when the raid-
ing party of thirty-six officers "hit" it.
Since the search warrant was issued by a
Colorado Court, the federal requirement of
knocking and announcement did not, strictly
speaking, in this case apply;61 however, federal
agents from the Bureau of Narcotics and Dan-
gerous Drugs, and the Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms Division of the U. S. Treasury De-
partment were in the raiding party. It was felt
that if the search uncovered any federal viola-
tions such as narcotics or firearms, the federal
agents might wish to prosecute also. For this
reason a decision was made to adhere to the
federal standard of announcing the presence
and purpose of the officers so that no question
could be legitimately raised later that the
execution of the search warrant did not meet
federal statutory requirements.
At the time of this raid, Colorado Rules of
Criminal Procedure required a "positive"
affidavit for nighttime searches; and since the
affidavit was not positive, the raid had to be
made in the daytime.
Thus, under two rules based upon concep-
tions of "fair play" the officers had to make
their approach to the house in full daylight,
and the persons in the house had to be alerted
to the officers approach. This despite the fact
that the officers knew that the occupants were
armed and, further, that they had records for
crimes of violence. At 7:30 A.M., the Sheriff
of Gilpin County announced the officers'
61The requirements of 18 U.S.C. 3109 do not apply
to the States if fundamental due process provisions are
otherwise adhered to. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23,
(1963). In Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585
(1968), there is an intimation "exigent circumstances"




presence over the loudspeaker of his car. For-
tunately, all of the violators were asleep; and,
due to the element of surprise, the violators
were captured in their beds. Most had fully
loaded guns in bed with them. All, later told the
raiders in no uncertain terms that they would
have shot it out with them if they had not been
caught asleep. Twenty-nine firearms were
seized including a machine gun, sawed-off
shotguns, rifles and pistols.
Careful planning of the raid plus a certain
amount of luck resulted in an accomplishment
of the law enforcement objective without any
shooting or killing. The fact remains, how-
ever, that the officers were exposed to a greater
amount of danger because of the required
daylight approach and the required announce-
ment. A fire-fight most certainly would have
occurred if an early rising occupant of the
house, glancing out the window, had seen the
approaching officers; or if the Sheriff's an-
nouncement had alerted them before they were
covered and subdued.
A second case presented a similar situation
except that the search warrant for narcotics
was a federal warrant; however, the Denver
Police were requested to participate in the
raid. Since the warrant was federal, and the
affidavit was not "positive", the requirement
of announcement and daylight entry were
applicable in this case also.
The target was a mountain cabin in which
two young men had an illicit laboratory for the
manufacture of methamphetanine ("speed").
One of the federal narcotic agents, under-
cover, had been inside the cabin. While he
was there, one of the violators, a person of
extreme mental and emotional instability,
told the agent that he would not be taken
alive on a raid. The violator showed the agent
a twenty-five pound can of ether, and he told
the agent that, if an attempt were made to
raid the cabin, he would throw the open can
of ether into an open fire which he always
kept going. If he did so, the entire cabin
would likely have been blown up. A medical
doctor who was with the raiding party con-
firmed that the highly volatile ether could
cause such an explosion. The undercover
agent believed that the violator was unstable
enough to carry out his threat to throw the
ether in the fire. As in the prior example, the
raid was conducted just at daylight. One agent
knocked on the door and announced his pur-
pose while the others were at the windows
ready to shoot if any of the occupants ap-
peared to be going for the ether. Again, careful
planning and luck paid off; both violators
were asleep and were taken without trouble.
As in the other raid, however, the fact re-
mains that if one of the violators had risen
early and looked out the window the story
might have been a different one, since the
ether and the open fire were in fact present
when the raid was made.
These examples show how rules of "fair play"
may be viewed quite differently by those whom
they affect. In both of the described raids, the
officers would have been much less vulnerable if
they had been permitted to make an approach
under cover of night and to make an unannounced,
surprise entry. Although, not advocating night-
time execution of search warrants or unannounced
entry in all cases, the writer believes that there
should be some flexibility 2 in these areas in order
to permit the officers to take basic precautions for
their own safety.6 3 Surely, this is one area in which
the police should speak out very loudly.
Illustrative of the fact that, whether or not the
police speak out, the civil liberties groups and
liberals, in general, will speak out is an article in
the (Denver) Rocky Mountain News of July 15,
1969. In this article, entitled, "No-Knock Entry
Meets Opposition", the American Civil Liberties
Union is reported as opposing a Nixon Administra-
tion proposal which would authorize an unan-
nounced entry to arrest or search, provided ad-
vance authorization for such entry from a magis-
trate is secured. Melvin Wulf, Legal Director of
the ACLU, objected to such a law because "it
offends our notion of what is just and fair". The
police should let it be known that what is "just
and fair" from the safety of Mr. Wulf's office may
seem quite a bit different to an officer going into a
house full of armed men. Fortunately, most judges
and legislators are reasonable men, and they
62 Cf., e.g., #799 New York Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure which permits unannounced entry if a judge so
endorses on the warrant.63An excellent discussion of the announcement-
prior-to-entry question, including the safety of the offi-
cer is "The Rule of Announcement and Unlawful En-
try: Miller v. U.S. and Ker v. California", by G. Robert
Blakey in 112 U. 1PxN. L. x~v 499 (1964). Professor
Blakey is now Chief Counsel to the U.S. Senate Judi-
ciary Committee.
[Vol. 61
SPEAKING FOR THE POLICE
usually exhibit a valid concern for the safety of
law enforcement officers;" nevertheless, it is in-
cumbent upon law enforcement officers to bring
to the attention of the courts and lawmakers the
practical problems that frequently confront them.
WiLL SPEAKING OUT HA E ANY RESULTS?
Thus far in this article an attempt has been made
to set forth examples of the types of issues about
which the police should become vocal. The basic
premises common to all of the examples presented
is, first, that there is a gigantic difference between
theory and actuality in the criminal law enforce-
ment area; second, in many cases, when theory
and reality meet theory breaks down resulting in
decreased police effectiveness; and, third, that no
one except the policeman is in a position to speak
authoritatively about the bows and whys of this
decrease in effectiveness. The question still re-
mains: If the police do speak out on the issues, will
this articulation produce any results?' In attempt-
ing to answer this question, the following section
describes some examples of the police speaking
out; and, where concrete results have been ac-
complished, a description of these results will be
given.
Speaking to the U.S. Supreme Court
In two recent cases, an attempt was made to
speak to the United States Supreme Court on be-
half of the police. In each instance, the Court was
asked to consider certain decisions in light of their
practical effects on police work. In the first case,
Terry v. Ohio,65 the "stop and frisk" case, this
approach was eminently successful. In the second
case, involving a petition for rehearing in Chimel v.
California, the approach was completely unsuc-
cessful.
In Terry, the Court was given a police oriented
point of view through an amicus curiae brief filed
by an organization called Americans for Effective
Law Enforcement. AELE is a new arrival on the
criminal justice scene, but, it is potentially one of
the strongest organizations that could be con-
ceived of because it represents ".... Americans, by
far the majority, who have an interest in seeing
that reasonable, non-abusive police procedures
which prevent crime and catch criminals are sus-
tained by the courts"."
84See, e.g., the comments of the Supreme Court of
Missouri in Slate v. Moody, supra note 26.6 5392 U.S. 1 (1968)
66 Amicus curiae brief filed in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
AELE was founded in 1966 by Professor Fred
E. Inbau of the Northwestern University School
of Law, as a not-for-profit, non-partisan, non-
political corporation, under the laws of the State
of Illinois. As stated above, AELE has entered
the criminal justice fray on the side of the law
abiding majority. By a rough comparison, where
the American Civil Liberties Union seeks to protect
the civil liberties of our citizens, AELE will pro-
tect the right of our citizens to "secure for them-
selves the domestic tranquility and justice that
has been guaranteed in the Preamble to The Con-
stitution of the United States"."
The amicus brief in Terry was written by James
R. Thompson who, at that time, was a Professor of
Law at the Northwestern University Law School.
A former Cook County Assistant States' Attorney
and now federal prosecutor, Mr. Thompson is an
authority on arrest, search, and seizure, interroga-
tion, and related police problems. In writing the
brief for AELE, he was speaking for the police
in the truest sense. In the brief, he stated:
"Apart from the desire of AELE to give
voice to the American public concerned about
crime and its consequences, we believe that it
is important to also express what we think
are the views of the law enforcement profes-
sion as a whole, unrestricted by the needs or
desires to uphold a particular decision or to
sustain a particular arrest or search". 9
Before going into an analysis of Mr. Thompson's
brief, it is necessary to set forth the facts of the
Terry case and the problems involved; that is, the
highly controversial question of "stop and frisk".
Martin McFadden had been a Cleveland Police
Detective for 35 years, assigned as a plainclothes
officer to look for pickpockets and shoplifters in
the downtown area of that city. At about 2:30 in
the afternoon on October 31, 1963, McFadden
1, (1968) by Americans for Effective Law Enforcement,
page 2. Hereafter this brief will be referred to as the
"Amicus brief-Terry".
67Professor Inbau is an internationally recognized
authority on criminal law and police procedures. He has
been a stalwart supporter of policemen who wish to do
their job in a proper and constitutional manner. He is
the unquestioned leader of that minority segment of the
academic legal profession that is concerned with the
problems that the police must face in doing their jobs.
The law enforcement profession as a whole owes a great
debt to "Freddie the Cop".
c" Preamble to the By-Laws of Americans for Effec-
tive Law Enforcement, p. 2.69 Amicus brief-Terry, p. 4.
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observed two individuals, Terry and Chilton on
the street. He had never seen either Terry or
Chilton before, but they caught his attention. He
testified: "Now, in this case when I looked over
they didn't look right to me at the time"Y0 Terry
and Chilton were observed by McFadden taking
turns walking up to a store and peering in the
window; this happened several times. To the ex-
perienced eye of Detective McFadden the two
were: "casing a job, a stickup", n McFadden de-
cided to investigate further; he went up to Terry
and Chilton and asked their names. When Terry
only mumbled something in reply, McFadden
patted down his outer clothes and, feeling a pistol,
retrieved it. A pat down of Chilton also revealed
a pistol. Both men were arrested for carrying con-
cealed weapons?2 Both Terry and Chilton were
convicted on the concealed weapons charge, and
this conviction was affirmed on appeal 8 The
Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari 4 to determine whether the admission of
the revolvers against Terry and Chilton 5 violated
their Fourth Amendment rights. The court ruled
that the weapons were properly seized and affirmed
Terry's conviction.
The only purpose of this account of the Terry
case is to point out how the Court was "spoken to"
through an articulation of a police point of view;
therefore, a thorough discussion of the analysis of
the Court is not called for here. Suffice to say that
on the facts of the Terry case as outlined above, the
Supreme Court of the United States granted a
narrowly defined right of "stop" and "frisk" to
the police. This authority was summed up by Chief
justice Warren:
"We merely hold today that where a police
officer observes unusual conduct which leads
him reasonably to conclude in the light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot
and that the persons with whom he is dealing
may be armed and presently dangerous; where
in the course of investigating this behavior,
he identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries; and where nothing in the
initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel
70 392 U.S. 1. The facts given herein are taken from
Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court in Terry.71392 U.S. 1 at 3.
72 Ohio Revised Code #2923.01 (1953).7 'State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N.E. 2d 114
(1966)
¢4387 U.S. 929 (1967).71 Chilton died when the appeal to the Supreme Court
was pending so only the Terry case reached the court.
his reasonable fear for his own or others'
safety, he is entitled for the protection of him-
self and others in the area to conduct a care-
fully limited search of the outer clothing of
such persons in attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him. Such a
search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment and any weapons seized may
properly be introduced in evidence against
the person from whom they were taken"? 6
The Supreme Court in Terry did not explicitly
state the extent to which their decision was based
on the arguments presented in the AELE amicus
brief; and, certainly the brief of the State of Ohio
and oral arguments were also factors in influencing
the Courts decision. Nevertheless, it is significant
that in Chief Justice Warren's language quoted
above, the Court did almost exactly what the
AELE amicus brief had asked it to do. The AELE
brief closed with an appeal that the Court acknowl-
edge the soundness of the view expressed by the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice, Task Force Report:
The Police, when it said:
"The Commission believes that there is a
definite need to authorize the police to stop
suspects and possible witnesses of major
crimes, to detain them for a brief questioning
if they will not voluntarily cooperate, and to
search such suspects for dangerous weapons
when such precaution is necessary". 7
This language which AELE incorporated into
its request to the Court to affirm is sufficiently
like the language quoted above, which the Court
used to summarize its holding, so that there can
really be no doubt that the AELE brief contrib-
uted in large measure to the Terry decision.
Let us look, then, at the AELE amicus brief as
an excellent example of speaking for the police. In
the Argument section, Mr. Thompson began by
attempting to specify what "stop and frisk" is and
what it is not. He defined the "stop":
"A police officer may detain pedestrians or
motorists in public places and question them
as to their identity and purpose in the particu-
lar location, when under the circumstances,
such detention and questioning seems appro-
priate to a prudent police officer---one mindful
76392 U.S. 1 at 30-31.
7 'Ainicus brief-Terry, p. 29.
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of his responsibility 'to prevent crime and
catch criminals'--because reasonable suspicion
of criminality has been aroused, although there
is not yet probable cause to believe that a
crime has been or is being committed"Y'
With regard to the "frisk":
If the above described police conduct is
constitutional, as we believe it is, the officer
involved must have the power to act reason-
ably to protect himself from attack, or to pre-
vent the suspect's escape, during the course of
the detention and inquiry" 9
Thus, having presented an accurate definition
of "stop and frisk", as he sees it, Mr. Thompson
applied this standard to police conduct. He dis-
cussed the difference between random stopping
and frisking without cause and particular stopping
and frisking where an officer's reasonable suspicion
has fallen upon a particular person or persons in
particular circumstances. It is this latter stop and
frisk that he sought to isolate and justify as con-
stitutional. In so doing, he used as examples the
facts of two cases, Terry v. Ohio, discussed above,
and State v. Diley, 0 a New Jersey Supreme Court
case, quite similar to Terry, in which a "stop" and
protective "frisk" had produced the seized weapon.
He pointed out that in both Terry and Dilley the
officers' suspicions had narrowed on particular
persons and that neither case involved random or
arbitrary conduct on the part of the police. He
then called for a more flexible view of the Fourth
Amendment. Speaking for AELE and for the
police, he urged:
"... that there may be a concept of variable
probable cause which applies to pre-arrest
investigatory procedures such as field interoga-
tion, and that the true test is the balancing of
the degree of interference with personal liberty
against the information possessed by the officer
which impelled him to act".'
In the second section of the AELE brief, Mr.
Thompson answered point by point the position of
the opponents of stop and frisk. He demolished
with dear logic each point made by the amicus
curiae for the petitioner, the NAACP Legal De-
fense and Educational Fund, Inc. In each instance,
7Idem p. 6.
79 Idem p. 6 and 7.
0 40 N.J. 460, 231 A. 2d, 353 (1967).81 Amicus brief-Terry p. 13.
he justified "stop and frisk" only so long as it is
held in the context of proper police conduct.
Finally, he summed up the relationship of the
police and the ghetto:
"The police could, of course, withdraw from
the ghetto and end all police-citizen conflicts.
This alternative might be somewhat tolerable,
if only criminals lived in the ghetto; at least
their interferences with human liberty in the
form of murder, robbery, rape and other
crimes, would be practiced only on each other.
But, others live in the ghetto as well-inno-
cent, law-abiding American citizens; by far
the over-whelming majority. They are en-
titled under the same Constitution which the
amicus says compels the rejection of stop and
frisk to live their lives and experience the
safety of their homes and their streets without
fear of criminal marauders. They have suf-
fered enough-discrimination, poverty, lack
of education, appalling conditions of housing,
and community alienation. Must they also be
deprived of their right to the protection of the
laws as well?" 12
This AELE brief is a classic example of an
instance where speaking for the police produced
results. At no point, did Mr. Thompson advocate
"rubber stamping" just anything the police want,
nor did he advocate improper police procedures;
what he did advocate, however, is a standard of
reasonableness should be applied to certain "on
the street" confrontations and advocated it with
success.
It is not a particularly pleasant task to turn from
describing a highly successful brief that someone
else wrote to describing a highly unsuccessful
brief that the author of this paper wrote; never-
theless, it is submitted that in this paper, dealing
with the question of speaking for the police, the
unsuccessful brief filed by the Denver Police
Department in support of the California Attorney
General's petition for rehearing in the case of
Chimel v. California should be described. The
Denver Police brief is, to the author's knowledge,
the first brief ever filed by a police department, as
such, in which an attempt was made to bring to the
attention of the Supreme Court of the United
States the practical problems that its decision has
created; second, one may hope that the Denver
12 Idem p. 28 and 29.
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Police Department brief will be the forerunner of
many more briefs going from the police directly to
the courts in an effort to present the police side of
the matter to the courts.
Chimel v. California was decided on June 23,
1969, the last day of the October 1968 term; con-
sequently, if a petition for rehearing was filed, no
action could be taken on the petition until the
beginning of the October 1969 term. On behalf of
the Attorney General of the State of California the
Honorable Thomas C. Lynch, Mr. Ronald M.
George, Deputy Attorney General for the State of
California filed a petition for rehearing in the case
of Chimel v. California. Mr. George had briefed
and argued Chimel in the Supreme Court. Mr.
George's petition for rehearing was joined by the
Attorneys General of thirty-five states and the
Territory of Guam.
In his petition for rehearing Mr. George stated:
"Furthermore, the Court's opinion provides
few if any guidelines to law enforcement in
meeting practical problems posed by the
decision". 3
Mr. George then described some of these prob-
lems: the question of how broad an interpretation
may be placed on a man's "reach", whether or not
the police may remain on the premises when a
warrant is being sought, the effect, if any, that
Chimel will have on the "plain view" doctrine; and
finally, the question of retroactivity s4 This brief-
an excellent piece of legal draftsmanship-con-
cisely and logically attempts to persuade the
Court to reconsider its holding in Chimel.
By August of 1969, two homicide cases in
Denver had occurred in which the police were
frustrated by the Chimel rule in their attempts to
recover the murder weapon. The writer felt that
if these cases were properly presented to the court,
they might demonstrate how police problems
suggested theoretically in Mr. George's brief
could arise, in actuality, when the police were con-
fronted by the over-broad language and lack of
guidelines in the Chimel opinion. Mr. George was
asked if he would care to have an amicus brief filed
by the Denver Police Department in support of his
petition for rehearing. He readily agreed. The
writer then contacted the Honorable Duke W.
83Petition for rehearing in Chimel v. California filed
by the Attorney General of the State of California, pg.
9.
84 Idem p. 9, 10 and 11.
Dunbar, Attorney General of the State of Colorado
and asked if the Denver Police Department could
file the brief through his office. He agreed and his
office was most cooperative in all matters of filing
the brief.
Two major points were kept in mind in the
preparation of the brief of the Denver Police
Department. First, the brief would not argue law,
but, rather, would attempt to present actual facts
to the Court in order to demonstrate the devas-
tating effect that Chinel had, or could have, when
applied in practice. Second, the brief did not ask
the Court to reverse itself in Chimel; merely to
grant a rehearing in order to further examine the
practical effects of Chimel; and to give the police
some guidelines. Thus, the Denver Police Depart-
ment's ainicus brief closed the Argument section
with the following appeal:
"We most respecfully urge the Court to
grant Respondent's Petition for Rehearing
in the case of Chimel v. California so that an
opportunity might be presented for spokesmen
for law enforcement, on every level, to make
known to the Court the impact of this decision
on our function of protecting the safety of the
people of this country. Further, as a result of
such rehearing the Court would have an oppor-
tunity to consider the establishment of the
guidelines in this area which the police so
desperately need". 5
The Denver Police amicus brief's basic appeal
brought to the Court's attention the two previ-
ously described Denver cases in which Chimel
created a "constitutional straight jacket" for the
police. The facts of the two cases were described
in detail,88 and they were analyzed to show how
circumstances conspired to create a situation in
which the police were prevented from legally
seizing the murder weapon. 7 The analysis was the
same in both cases:
1. Police learn where a murder suspect may
be found and proceed there at once to arrest
him. There is no time to get a search
warrant because the suspect may be alerted
8 Amicus Curiae brief of the Colorado Attorney
General and the Denver Police Department in support
of the California Attorney General's Petition for Re-
hearing. p. 16. Hereafter referred to as Denver Amicus
Brief-Chimel.
S6 Idem Pp. 5-10.
87 Idem Pp. 10-14.
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that the police are seeking him and may
flee.
2. Friends or family of the suspect, who have
every reason to wish to protect him, are on
the premises where the arrest takes place.
Consent to search for the murder weapon is
refused and Ciimel bars an arrest-based
search.
3. The police must wait while a search warrant
is obtained; but, in the meantime, the
others on the premises have every oppor-
tunity to dispose of the weapon. The
police cannot lawfully search the others
on the premises because there is no probable
cause to arrest them. Even if the others
were searched and the murder weapon
found, the police would risk having the
weapon suppressed as the fruit of an
unlawful search; and further; the police
risk civil liability in assault and battery or
other tort for making the unlawful search
of the person. In both Denver cases,
weapons were, in fact, disposed of by those
on the premises; and, when the search
warrants were finally obtained the warrant-
based searches were fruitless.
It was hoped that these cases would show the
Court how the broad language of Chimel became a
constitutional shield for the friends or relatives of
murder suspects who wished to accommodate the
suspects by disposing of incriminating evidence
against them. It was further hoped that Mr.
George's petition for rehearing which advised the
Court of the problems which Chimel could cause,
together with the Denver Police brief pointing
out the actual problems that Chimel did cause,
might persuade the Court to grant a rehearing and
give the police sone guidelines so that the police
could cope with such problems in the future.
Finally, it was hoped that the fact that over
two-thirds of the Attorneys General of the States
joined in the petition for rehearing might convince
the Court of the seriousness with which Chimel was
viewed in the law enforcement community. Never-
theless, the Court denied rehearing without
opinion."
Thus, we see two cases where the police, or some-
one speaking for the police, attempted to "speak
to" the Supreme Court of the United States. In
the one case, Terry v. Ohio, the Court listened, in
8 October 13, 1969, No. 770, 6 Cr.L. 4019
the other case, Chimel v. California, a good faith
attempt to present police problems to the Court
met with curt dismissal. Even the disappointing
result of "speaking out" in the Chimel case may
presage a more encouraging future; for a number
of police departments have expressed an interest
in filing similar briefs, and perhaps if enough
departments are heard from, the Court may begin
to listen more.
An additional encouraging note for the police
concerning the Denver Police amicus brief is the
fact that Senator John L. McClellan of Arkansas
saw fit to incorporate that part of the brief which
describes the two Denver homicide cases, verbatim,
into the Congressional Record. This came about
during a speech before the Senate on October 23,
1969 in which Senator McClellan reviewed the im-
pact of Chimel on the police, citing the two Denver
cases as examples of the disastrous effects of that
decision.
Regarding the Denver cases Senator McClellan
stated:
"These two examples graphically show how our
law enforcement officers are increasingly being re-
stricted by court-imposed special rules of criminal
procedure. They give flesh and bones to the anti-
septic statistics I noted above."
Here we see an unexpected, but very welcome,
result of speaking out. In attempting to reach the
Court, the brief came to the attention of the
United States Senator who has probably done more
than any other figure in this country to combat
crime in a constructive and constitutional manner.
Speaking to a State Supreme Court-
In two recent instances, the Colorado Supreme
Court 9 gave consideration and attention to re-
quests by the Denver Police Department and the
Denver District Attorney's Office for changes in
the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure that
were felt by these agencies to have been necessi-
tated by recent decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States. In both cases, the Colorado
Court adopted Rules that will be of immeasurable
assistance to law enforcement.
Lest there be any misunderstanding, the writer
wishes to state emphatically at this point that the
the Colorado Supreme Court is in no way a "rubber
stamp" for the police. When the police are wrong,
19 Honorable Robert H. McWilliams, Ch. J; Hon.
Edward C. Day, James X. Groves, Paul V. Hodges,
Donald Kelley, Robert Lee, Edward E. Pringle J.J.
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the Court brings them up short in no uncertain
terms;"° and, the Court is deeply concerned with
individual rights." However, the Colorado Court
is also concerned with the rights of society as a
whole; and it has consistently taken a realistic
view of the day-to-day problems that the police
must face.
Let us consider the response of the Colorado
Court, by looking at the Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure that the Court adopted:
Rule 41, Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure-
The "Night Search Warrant" Rule:
Chimel, with all of its implications was decided
on June 23, 1969. One immediate source of concern
to the forces of law enforcement in Colorado was
the previously discussed requirements in the
Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure that search
warrants which are to be executed at night must be
based on a "positive" affidavit.
2
In Denver, after Chimel, the "night search
warrant" rule quickly cost the police evidence in
several cases. In one, an informant of unquestioned
reliability advised that a "pot party" was taking
place at night at a certain house. Only a few
people including the informant were to be present.
The informant was at the party and left to tell the
police about it. The informant absolutely refused to
be "fronted", that is, to have his identity made
known. Under the recent United States Supreme
Court cases of McCray v. Illinois," and Spinelli v.
U.S.,14 if a search warrant affidavit clearly shows
a basis for trusting the informant's reliability and a
basis for believing how the informant knows where
the property sought is located, then a confidential
informant's identity need not be revealed. How-
ever, in order to make a positive statement to
support a nighttime search warrant, the affidavit
for search warrant would have had to state that the
informant saw the marijuana in the house at least
within a few hours of the time that the warrant was
procured. There had been only a few people present
at the party, and this positive statement would
"0 See, e.g., Gallegos v. People, 401 P. 2nd 613 (1965),
suppressing evidence seized incident to an arrest for
which the only "probable cause" was that defendant
ran as the police approached. Hernandez v. People, 153
Colo. 316, 385 P. 2nd 996, (1963) suppressing evidence
seized pursuant to a purely conclusory search warrant.
1 See, e.g., Walker v. State of Colorado, Colorado
Supreme Court, (8/25/69) reversing a murder convic-
tion because of prejudicial pretrial publicity.
02 CRCP Rule 41, (prior to October 1, 1969).
93 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
9 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
have narrowed the number of suspected informants
down to those present within a period of a few
hours. The violators could, therefore, by process of
elimination, ascertain with reasonable certainty
who the informant was. This would have "fronted"
the informant as surely as placing his name in the
affidavit. In view of the Denver Police Depart-
ment's cardinal rule that an informant is never
"fronted" without his consent, even by implication,
and because the officers felt a positive warrant
would do just this, no warrant was sought and the
pot party went undisturbed. By daytime, of
course, all the evidence was gone.
The writer discussed this matter with James
Creamer, then the Chief Deputy District Attorney
for Denver. Mr. Creamer suggested that Justice
Edward Pringle of the Colorado Supreme. Court
be advised of the problem and the matter was
presented to the Justice.
If any member of a distinguished bench can be
said to be "the" specialist in an area of law, Justice
Pringle is the search and seizure expert on the
Colorado Supreme Court. A former Chief Justice
of the Court, Justice Pringle has a national rep-
utation in the search and seizure field, and he
has written extensively on this subject, both on
the bench and off. 95 It was felt that an approach
to the Court on this problem could best be made
through Justice Pringle.
The problem of the Colorado night search
warrant rule was explained to Justice Pringle.
Prior to Chimel, in cases such as that described
in the foregoing example, officers could have
entered the "pot" party to make a lawful arrest
and an arrest-based search for the contraband
could have been made. Since Chimel now forbade
this, officers in Colorado were at an impasse at
night if they were not positive for purposes of a
search warrant affidavit, or if the positive warrant
would jeopardize an informant's anonymity.
Justice Pringle was asked if he would present to
the Court a request that the positive requirement
for a night search warrant be dropped from the
Rules;" he agreed and the Court heeded the Police
"See, e.g., Pringle and Fairfield, The Expanding
Power of Police to Search and Seize: Effect of Recent U.S.
Supreme Court Decisions on Criminal Investigation., 40
U. COL L. Rnv 491 (1968) See also Hernandez v. People,
153 Col. 316, 385. P. 2d 996 (1963), in which a review
of the law of search and seizure was made by Justice
Pringle which has been the guiding authority on Colo-
rado search and seizure law since the decision was
handed down.
96 The requirement for a positive affidavit to support
a nighttime search is not a Constitutional doctrine.
Rather it is based on notions of "fair play."
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Department's request. Since October 1, 1969, a
search warrant based on probable cause may be
executed "at any time" in Colorado.
"Speaking to" the Colorado Court, the police
made known a very practical problem that had
arisen since Chimel v. California. The Court's
response was encouraging; and if the police use the
new authority granted in a proper manner9 police
effectiveness will be greatly enhanced, without
doing violence to individual rights or liberties.
The other problem presented by the police to the
Court was more complicated, as will be seen in the
following discussion of the second Rule of Criminal
Procedure adopted by the Colorado Supreme
Court at the request of the Denver Police Depart-
ment.
Rule 41.1, Court Order for Fingerprinting
There was no question that Davis v. Mississippi,
prohibiting the use of fingerprints taken pursuant
to an unlawful arrest, was decided on a Constitu-
tional basis." Thus, Colorado, as every other state,
is bound by the United States Supreme Court's
holding under the doctrine of Mapp v. Ohio.s9
Unlike the "night search warrant" rule, which the
Colorado Supreme Court could change under its
rule-making power, 100 any Rules of Criminal
Procedure affecting the fingerprint question must
conform to the mandate of Davis.
If the Colorado Supreme Court were asked to
adopt a Rule of Criminal Procedure allowing the
police to take fingerprints in certain cases, even
though there was no probable cause to arrest in the
traditional sense, they would have to be convinced
that such a procedure was constitutional within
the limits of Davis. The writer felt that this could
be done, and, as counsel for the Denver Police
Department, filed a brief on behalf of that Depart-
ment with the Colorado Court asking for such a
rule. In effect, the police were speaking to the
Court. Basically, what the police needed was a
Rule that would allow the police to apply to a
court for a judicially approved order to bring in
and fingerprint persons who were suspects in
" See text at notes 127 et seq., infra, for the steps
taken by the Court to insure that the police did in fact
utilize the Rule in a proper manner.
9 Brennan, writing the opinion in Davis, framed the
issue as: ".. .whether fingerprints obtained from peti-
tioner should have been excluded from evidence as the
product of a detention which was unlawful under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments". 89 S. Ct. 1394
at 1394.
99 367 U.S. 643 (1961)300 Col. Rev. Stat. 37-2-27
criminal cases even though there was no proable
cause for their arrest. The Court, to consider our
request, had to be convinced on three points:
1. That the police needed such a rule;
2. That such a rule, in theory, would be con-
sistent with Davis, as a matter of constitu-
tional law; and,
3. That the rule, as written, was also consist-
ent with Davis, and with concepts of
individual rights.
The first point presented to the Colorado Court
was the need for such a procedure. The problem
was presented to the Court that in many cases
the police are confronted with the following type
situation:
1. A crime has been committed and fingerprints
have been found at the scene. The prints are
possibly or probably those of the perpetrator of the
crime.
2. The circumstances of the case are such that
there are several suspects; yet, these same circum-
stances are not sufficient, in themselves, to give the
police probable cause to arrest the suspects. No
further evidence is forthcoming.
3. Police records are checked, and there are no
prints on file for any of the suspects. (It was
pointed out to the Court that this can happen in a
great many cases. With more and more crimes
being committed by juveniles, it quite often
happens that, because the suspects are juveniles,
they have not been arrested or have not been
fingerprinted beforeY" Further, being juveniles
the suspects would rarely have had fingerprints
taken for military service.)
4. The police know that if they bring a suspect
in for compelled fingerprinting, in the absence of
probable cause to arrest him, Davis will render the
prints inadmissible in Court.
5. Of course, there is nothing to stop the police
from going to a suspect and asking him to come in
voluntarily for fingerprinting; but, the suspect
would have to be warned, in no uncertain terms,
that he was not required to come in. Suppose in
the given case, the suspect who was politely asked
to come in for fingerprinting, is, in fact, the per-
petrator of the crime for which he is suspect. If the
suspect is of even average intelligence, he will
101 In fact, the Colorado Children's Code CRS 22-2-2
(6) Rule prohibits a juvenile's fingerprints being sent to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation unless a court has
ordered him held for criminal proceedings.
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refuse to accompany the officers. 2 In addition,
the request that he submit to fingerprinting will
have apprised him of the following facts:
(a) That he is a suspect.
(b) That he left fingerprints at the scene.
(c) That despite this fact, there is insufficient
evidence to arrest him.
(d) That if he leaves the jurisdiction at once
he has an excellent chance of getting away
free and clear.
6. The police, then, are faced with choice of
possibly alerting their suspect or of total inaction.
As examples of this impasse that the police can
often find themselves confronted with, the two
Denver cases cited above as examples of the
effects of Davis on the local police were presented to
the Court. One of these cases, involved a homicide
with prints found at the scene, multiple suspects
but no probable cause to arrest them; and, there-
fore, no constitutional way to connect the prints
with the suspects. The other case involved a
burglary with prints found, very few suspects, but
still no probable cause to arrest and no way to
connect the suspects and prints. The point was
made to the Court that the chain of events de-
scribed above can arise in almost any type of case
and is not limited to homicides and burglaries."°'
Thus, the attempt was made to show the need
for a fingerprinting rule; however, even if the
Court were convinced beyond any shadow of a
doubt that thepolice desperately needed such a rule,
if the rule could not be drawn to conform with
Davis' mandate, it could not constitutionally be
approved by the Court. The next problem, then,
was to justify the creation of such a rule. For this,
the writer turned to dicta in the Davis case itself.
Justice Brennan, after laying down the Davis rule
wrote:
"It is arguable, however, that because of
the unique nature of the fingerprinting proc-
ess such detentions might, under narrowly
defined circumstances, be found to comply
10 Or, if the suspect must be permitted to call his
attorney, (as would almost surely be required under the
rationale of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
and United States v. Wade 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and
Gilbert v. California 388 U.S. 263 (1967) requiring the
presence of counsel, unless waived, at interrogation or
line-ups), the attorney would be duty bound in most, if
not all, cases to advise his client not to voluntarily sub-
mit to fingerprinting.
"0 For instance, in the Davis case itself the crime was
rape.
with the Fourth Amendment even though
there is no probable cause in the traditional
sense. See Cantara v. Municipal Courts, 387
U.S. 523 (1963). Detention for fingerprinting
may constitute a much less serious intrusion
upon personal security than other types of
police searches and detentions. Fingerprinting
involves none of the probing into the individ-
ual's private life and thoughts which marks
an interrogation or search. Nor can finger-
print detention be employed repeatedly to
harass any individual since the police need
only one set of each person's prints. Further-
more, fingerprinting is an inherently more
reliable and effective crime solving tool than
eyewitness identification or confessions and
is not subject to such abuses as the improper
line-up or third degree.
"Finally, because there is no danger of
destruction of fingerprints, the limited de-
tention need not come unexpectely or at an
inconvenient time. For this reason, the general
requirement that the authorization of a
judicial officer be obtained in advance of
detention would seem not to admit of any
exception in the fingerprint context"."4
Justice Brennan went on to note that since no
attempt was made to obtain advance approval to
fingerprint Davis himself, Davis presents no
occasion to:
".... determine whether the requirements
of the Fourth Amendment could be met by
narrowly circumscribed procedures for obtain-
ing, during the course of a criminal investiga-
tion, the fingerprints of individuals for whom
there is no probable cause for arrest".'0'
Thus, what is said in Davis on this subject is the
purest dicta, yet it seems to be an invitation for
someone to come up with the "narrowly circum-
scribed procedures" that Brennan hints at. And
who is better suited to accept Brennan's challenge
than the police, for they are most directly affected
by Davis. Here was an excellent opportunity for
the police to speak out in a very constructive
manner.
The question then became whether it was pos-
"1 89 S. Ct. 1394, 1398. Note that Justice Harlan in
his concurring opinion in Davis would leave open the
question of whether advance judicial approval is an ab-
solute necessity in every case.
105 Iden; at 1398.
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sible to draw a constitutional procedure for prior
judicial approval for compelled fingerprinting in
the absence of probable cause for arrest. The
answer lay in the application and interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreason-
able searches and seizures. "The Fourth Amend-
ment protects people, not places"'°6; but, at the
same time, "... what the C6nstitution forbids is
not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable
searches and seizures"." 7
Can, then, a search and seizure be reasonable, in
certain cases, even though there is an absence of
"probable cause" in the traditional sense. Phrased
another way, are there certain situations in which
an invasion of personal or proprietary privacy may
be considered reasonable despite the lack of prob-
able cause? The Denver Police contended to the
Colorado Supreme Court that the answer to
both questions was "yes".
The authority for the premise that probable
cause in the traditional sense is not an absolute
requirement for all searches stems from two recent
United States Supreme Court cases, Camara v.
Municipal Court"' and Terry v. Ohio." In both
of these cases, the Court enters into a balancing
test of the governmental interest in the need to
prevent crime and protect police officers (Terry)
or to detect hazardous conditions (Camara),
against the interest of the individual's right to
privacy. As stated in Camara the question revolves
around "the need to search, against the invasion
which the search entails",UO
In the Camara case the Court overruled two
prior Supreme Court cases, Frank v. Maryland"'
and Ohio ex rel Eatn v. Price,"' cases which had
upheld the right of states to punish homeowners
for refusing to permit municipal inspectors to
inspect the homes in question without warrants.
In Camara, Justice White, writing for the major-
ity,"" enunciated the new rule that even adminis-
trative searches such as municipal inspections are
required by the Fourth Amendment to be con-
ducted under a "warrant procedure", except in
emergency circumstances. However, Justice White
rejected the contention that probable cause, as
such, must be shown to believe that each dwelling,
M" Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
"07 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).1-l 387 U.S. 523 (1967)
"0' 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
I'D 387 U.S. 523, 537.
1359 U.S. 360 (1959)
11 364 U.S. 263 (1960).
" Justices Harlan, Clark, and Stewart dissented.
in particular, contained a violation of the code to be
enforced. He held that an "area inspection" based
on an appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole
would be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
if reasonable administrative and legislative stand-
ards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied.
He stated:
"The warrant procedure is designed to
guarantee that a decision to search private
property is justified by a reasonable govern-
mental interest. But, reasonableness is still
the ultimate standard. If a valid public
interest justifies the intrusion contemplated
there is probable cause to issue a suitably
restricted search warrant" 4
This language was cited to the Colorado, Court
as authority for the proposition that probable
cause was a flexible rather than an absolute stand-
ard; and, it was pointed out that Camara was the
case cited by Justice Brennan in Davis when he
discussed the possibility of a judicially supervised
process for fingerprinting."'
Terry v. Ohio, the "stop and frisk" case, dis-
cussed above, was cited as further authority for a
"balancing" of governmental against individual
interests. It will be remembered that the Court
in Terry weighed the need for preventive police
patrolling and the safety of the officer against the
individual's right to be free from invasions of
personal privacy. In Terry, an invasion of personal
security, suitablylimited to a brief detention and to
a pat down for weapons, was sanctioned, 'despite
the fact that probable cause for arrest was lacking.
The requirement for advance judicial approval in
the search and seizure area was also stressed by
Chief Justice Warren in the Terry opinion:
"The scheme of the Fourth Amendment
becomes meaningful only when it is assured
that at some point the conduct of those
charged with enforcing the laws can be sub-
jected to the more detached neutral scrutiny
of a judge who must evaluate the reasonable-
ness of a particular search and seizure in the
light of the particular circumstances." 116
From these cases, the Denver Police hoped to
1 387 U.S. 523, 539.
"'-89 S. Ct. 1394, 1398.
116 392 U.S. 1, 21. Warren pointed out that the street
t'pe encounters in the "stop and frisk" cases were ex-
ceptions to this rule.
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convince the Colorado Court that the flexible
standard of probable cause enunciated by the
Supreme Court in certain areas could, when
coupled with Justice Brennan's dicta in Davis
result in a constitutional procedure for compelled
fingerprinting pursuant to advance judicial author-
ity.
The next step was to draft a Rule of Criminal
Procedure that would meet all of the above tests.
The Rule of Criminal Procedure for finger-
printing, suggested by the Denver Police Depart-
ment which was adopted with one change117 by the
Colorado Supreme Court is as follows:
COLORADO RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
Rule 41.1 - COURT ORDER FOR FINGERPRINTING
(a) Authority to Issue Court Order for Finger-
printing: A Court Order for Fingerprinting
authorized by this rule may be issued by any
judge of the Supreme, District, Superior, or
County Court, (or of the Court of Appeals upon
the creation of that Court).
(b) Issuance of Order: A Court Order for Finger-
printing shall issue only on affidavit sworn to or
affirmed before the judge and establishing the
grounds for issuance of the order. The order
shall be directed to any peace officer of this
state. If the judge is satisfied that grounds for
the application exist, he shall issue the order
naming or describing the person to be finger-
printed. Grounds for the issuance of a Court
Order for Fingerprinting shall exist when it be
shown by facts alleged in an affidavit of a peace
officer that:
1. A known criminal offense has been com-
mitted, and,
2. There is reason to believe that the finger-
printing of the named or described indi-
vidual will aid in the apprehension of the
unknown perpetrator of such criminal
M This change was in paragraph (6) the original
draft read "Grounds for the issuance of a court order
for fingerprinting shall exist when it is shown by affida-
vit "of a peace officer that.. ." The Court very properly
changed this sentence to read: "Grounds for the is-
suance of a Court Order for Fingerprinting shall exist
when it be shown by facts alleged in an affidavit of a
peace officer that.. ." This is, of course, a restatement
of the position that warrants shall be based on facts and
not conclusions of the affiant. Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108 (1964) also Hernandez v. People 153 Colo.
316, 385 p. 2d 996 (1963) in which the Colorado Su-
preme Court anticipated the U.S. Supreme Court.
offense, or that there is reason to suspect
that the named or described individual is
connected with the perpetration of the
crime, and,
3. The fingerprints of the named or described
individual are not in the files of the agency
employing the affiant.
(c) Contents of the Order: The Order shall state:
1. The name or description of the individual
to be fingerprinted, and,
2. The names of any persons making affidavit
for the issuance of the Order, and,
3. The criminal offense concerning which the
Order has been issued, and,
4. A mandate to the officer to whom the Order
is directed to detain the person to be finger-
printed for only such time as is necessary
to obtain the fingerprints and to compare
such fingerprints to the fingerprints thought
to be related to the perpetrator of the
criminal offense, and,
5. The typewritten or printed name of the
judge issuing the Order and his signature
thereon.
(d) Execution and Return:
1. The Order may be executed and returned
only within ten days after its date.
2. The Order shall be executed in the daytime
unless the issuing judge shall endorse
thereon that it may be served at anytime
because it appears that the suspect may
flee the jurisdiction if the Order is not
served forthwith.
3. The officer executing the Order shall give to
the person fingerprinted a copy of the
Order.
4. No search of the person to be fingerprinted
under the Order may be made except a
protective search for weapons, unless a
separate warrant has been issued for such
search under Rule 41.
5. A return to the issuing judge shall be made
showing whether the person named or
described has been (a) detained for finger-
printing or not, and (b) released or arrested.
(e) Motion to Suppress: A person aggrieved by an
Order issued under this Rule may file a Motion
to Suppress fingerprints seized pursuant to such
Order and the said motion shall be granted if
there were insufficient grounds for issuance or if
the Order was improperly issued. The motion to
suppress the use of such fingerprints as evidence
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shall be made before trial unless opportunity
therefore did not exist or the defendent was not
aware of the grounds for motion, but the Court,
in its discretion, may entertain the motion at
the trial. (Effective October 1, 1969.)
With regard to the wording of the Order, the
following points were advanced to the Court:
1) The proposed rule in question was purposely
styled "Court Order for Fingerprinting", rather
than "Search Warrant for Fingerprinting", be-
cause the "warrant clauses" of both the United
Statesu and Colorado Constitutions"' specify
that warrants shall issue only upon probable cause.
Since, by definition, the desired rule for compelled
fingerprinting with prior judicial approval would
involve less than probable cause it was felt that
any drafting of the rule should be done based on the
respective clauses of each constitution that pro-
hibit only "unreasonable" searches and seizures' 20
That is, the Court Order for Fingerprinting is not
a "warrant" but rather it constitutes an otherwise
"reasonable" search. This was pointed up in Terry
when Chief Justice Warren emphasized in that
case, after distinguishing the warrant clause of the
Constitution of the United States: "Instead the
conduct involved in this case must be tested by the
Fourth Amendment's general proscription against
unreasonable searches and seizures"."'
Justice Pringle has also commented on the
flexibility of the "reasonable-unreasonable" di-
chotomy: "Even the [United States Supreme]
Court's severest critics do not expect it to disregard
the Fourth Amendment entirely. Rather, the
disagreements center on what sort of police con-
duct constitutes an 'unreasonable' search and
seizure as that elastic term is used in the Fourth
1 U.S. Constitution, Amendment 4: "...and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized".
19 Colorado Constitution-Artide II, Section 7:
"... . and no warrant to search any place or seize
any person or things shall issue without describing
the place to be searched or the person or thing to be
seized, as near as may be, not without probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation reduced to
writing".
120 U.S. Constitution-Fourth Amendment: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated..
Colorado Constitution-Article II, Section 7.
"The people shall be secure in their persons,
papers, homes and effects from unreasonable
searches and seizures;..."
"2392 U.S. 1.
Amendment"."2 The term "Court Order for
Fingerprinting" was accepted by the Court.
2) The rule requires an affidavit specifying that
facts, not mere conclusions, must support the
Court Order for Fingerprinting. In other words,
even though the standard for issuance of the Court
Order may be less than probable cause, no order
may lawfully issue based solely on an officer's
hunch.
3) A known criminal offense must be specified.
Court Orders for Fingerprinting are not to be used
for "fishing expeditions" or "round-ups" or we will
have gone full circle to the Davis situation. The
proposed rule was purposely not limited to felonies
because on occasion a misdemeanor can quickly
turn into a felony (e.g. a simple assault that
results in a death "turns into" murder or voluntary
manslaughter once the victim of the blow dies).
4) The requirement that the files of the agency
requesting the Court Order be searched will rule
our frivolous requests. This also comports with
Justice Brennan's emphasis on the point that since
fingerprints need only be taken once, the procedure
cannot be used for harassment."'
5) The Order requires that the "name or de-
scription" of the person to be fingerprinted be
supplied. Here the writer presented to the court
the possibility that in some cases, the name of a
party sought may not be known, but a description
of sufficient specificity to satisfy due process
requirements might be available. Consider this
hypothetical:
The roommate of a murdered girl tells the
police that her roommate had been seeing a
certain boy. She does not know his full name,
but he was called "Rick", was blonde, about
six feet tall, drove a brown Porsche and went
to Denver University. This description
should certainly contain sufficient specificity
for the issuance of a Court Order for Finger-
printing.
6) The Rule requires that the detention be kept
minimal. Brennan requires this in his dicta and the
idea comports with the notion of a limited detention
in those cases where there is less than probable
cause to arrest. Detention is, by the terms of the
order, strictly limited to that time necessary to
take and compare the fingerprints of the suspect.
If the suspect's prints match those believed to be
1 22 Pringle, op. cit. supra note 78 at p. 508.
" 89 Sup. Ct. 1394, 1398.
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related to the perpetration of the crime, this fact
would in most cases establish probable cause for
arrest of the person fingerprinted and this suspect.
would-then be arrested and processed as any other
arrestee;
7) The requirement of daytime execution of a
Court Order also stresses the necessity for a
minimum-intrusion. The only permissible exception
being when the issuing court is convinced that the
flight-of the suspect is imminent. Only when such a
judicial finding is made would a nighttime deten-
tion for fingerprinting be justified.
8) The person to be fingerprinted may be only
searched for weapons. This would comport with
Terry's emphasis on the necessity to protect the
officer, -but it will keep the physical intrusion
minimalU
9) The provision in the Rule for a Motion to
Suppress guarantees the suspect his fundamental
due process rights under the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments.
This, then, was the request of the Denver Police
to the Colorado Supreme Court and the Court
responded by adopting the rule. This was, to the
writer's knowledge, the first such rule to go into
effect in the United States and the first response to
Davis embodied in the law of any state.0 2
On September 19, 1969, Justices Edward Pringle
and Edward C. Day of the Colorado Supreme
Court announced the adoption by the Court of two
above described rules, effective October 1. The
Justices noted that the new rules were adopted as
a consequence of the Chimel and Davis decisions
respectively"26 and that the rules were "immedi-
ately necessary for effective police work". Both
Justices emphasized that if the rules were abused
by the police, the rules would be revised.
M If the suspect's prints matched the prints found at
the scene and he was arrested based on the match-up,
then, a thorough search of the person incident to the
arrest may be made. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969).
25 As of this writing, the Arizona Legislature has a
bill -introduced dealing with this matter, "Arizona
Statutes-New Chapter 5. Warrant to Detain for Pur-
pose of Fingerprinting. Secs. 13-1481 and 13-1482".
This has not become law. In addition, Senators Mc-
Clellan, Bruska, and Allott have introduced S. 2997
as an amendment to the United States Code; #3507
Detention for Obtaining Evidence of Identifying Phy-
sical Characteristics". Under this bill, a judicially
supervised procedure of obtaining any type of evidence
of physical characteristics (not just fingerprints)
would be provided.
26 See: "Explanation Covers Rules" in the Denver
Post, Fri., September 19, 1969 and "Colo High Court
Sets New Rules" in the (Denver) Rocky Mtn. News,
Sat., Sept. 20, 1969 p. 25.
One most important point must be made with
regard to the response of the Colorado Supreme
Court to the Denver Police Department's request
for the two rules described herein. If the police are
going to become vocal and request the Courts or
legislatures to take a certain position with regard
to police problems, then there devolves on the
police as the requesting parties, the grave responsi-
bility to utilize the requested procedures or laws in
a proper manner. This responsibility cannot be
overemphasized, and the writer, frankly can think
of nothing worse than a case in which the police,
after requesting and receiving a concession from the
courts or legislatures, would then turn around and
abuse this concession by employing it in an im-
proper manner. The Colorado Supreme Court felt
this way also. When Justices Pringle and Day
announced the new rules which the police had
requested, they very definitely asserted that abuse
of the rules would result in revision of the rules.
Justice Pringle went further than this. Before the
adoption of the rules was announced, he advised
the writer that the Court was going to accept the
proposed rules. At this time justice Pringle
strongly emphasized the need for proper use of the
broadened police powers embodied in the rules;
and, he stated that he wanted the entire law
enforcement community in Colorado to be put on
notice not to abuse the rules. He requested the
writer to see that this was done.in
The result of this request was a Training Bulle-
tin which the writer, through Chief of Police
George L. Seaton, issued to the Denver Police
Department describing the new rules. It was
intended that, at Justice Pringle's request, this
Bulletin would be sent to every law enforcement
agency in Colorado. A few excerpts will indicate
the tone that the bulletin takes. The second para-
graph of the bulletin states:
"The purpose of this bulletin is, first to
explain the new Rules, and, secondly, to ad-
vise our officers as strongly as possible that if
the broadened police powers in the new Rules
are abused, the Rules will be changed". 1"
"2 The writer is legal counsel for the Colorado
Association of Chiefs of Police as well as Legal Co-
ordinator for the Denver Police Department, and was
therefore in a position to speak with authority to a
relatively broad law enforcement audience.
"' Training Bulletin, p. 1.
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The bulletin describes the change in the "night
search warrant rule" and continues:
"From the beginning of the law of search
and seizure; courts and legislators have been
concerned with the idea of police breaking into
a man's house at night, even with a warrant.
The invasion of privacy is considered to be
greater at night than it is in the daytime. The
fact remains, however, that certain types of
criininal activity, such as burglary-or nar-
cotics are "crimes of the night", with the
violators using the cloak of darkness to conceal
their activities. As in all cases of police activ-
ity, the need for effective police procedures
must be balanced against the individual rights.
There can be no question, that, in many cases,
we need the right to be able to execute search
warrants in the nighttime when such warrants
are based on probable cause instead of a posi-
tive statement. BUT, WE MUST NOT
ABUSE THE NEW POWER THAT THE
COURT HAS GIVEN US. If we do, the
Court will take the power away; it's that
simple. When the new Rules were announced
by justices Pringle and Day of the Colorado
Supreme Court, both Justices said that, if
abuse by police is discovered, the rules will be
revised".12 9
The rule permitting a Court Order for Finger-
printing is then discussed in the Bulletin, and
guidelines are laid down for its implementation;
with regard to this rule the Bulletin states:
"These guidelines will be added to as the
law in this area is developed. The important
thing to remember is that a Court Order for
Fingerprinting is for a TEMPORARY
DETENTION only. Once the prints have
been taken a comparison should be made at
once. If the suspect matches the prints found
at the scene, he should be arrested. If he does
not match OR if a comparison cannot be
immediately made, he must be released. The
quickest way to get the Court to withdraw
this broadened police power is to abuse the
power by holding a suspect longer than is
necessary to print him and compare the prints.
The rule requires the officer to make a return
to the judge showing whether the suspect
has been detained for fingerprinting, or not;
and, whether, as a result of the fingerprinting,
gIbid p. 2.
the suspect has been either arrested or re-
leased".'3
The Training Bulletin concludes:
"The Colorado Supreme Court has recog-
nized the legitimate needs of law enforcement
in enacting the Rules discussed. It is now up to
the police to use these Rules properly as in-
vestigative tools; and, not to abuse the powers
the Court has granted".'
As a Denver Police Training Bulletin this infor-
mation naturally went to every Denver police
officer. In addition, thanks to the special coopera-
tion of Chief Ben Roach of the Commerce City
Police Department, President of the Colorado As-
sociation of Chiefs of Police, and Mr. A. S. Reeder,
Secretary of the Colorado Sheriffs and Peace Offi-
cers Association, a copy of this bulletin went to
every police chief, sheriff, and other top law en-
forcement executive in Colorado. In addition, the
writer has addressed both the Colorado Associa-
tion of Chiefs of Police and the Colorado Sheriffs
and Peace Officers Association regarding the new
rules and the necessity not to abuse them.
This point is stressed to emphasize that responsi-
bility goes with police articulation; and, that, if the
police become vocal concerning the laws under
which they operate, then any changes brought
about by the police speaking out must be regarded
by the police as evidences of trust that they must
not abuse.'2
The Denver Police and Colorado enforcement
generally is fortunate that Colorado has a Court
of the calibre of our Supreme Court which will
listen to police needs when the Court is in the exer-
0 Ibid p. 7 & 8.
M Ibid. p. 8.
M The Colorado Rules was not the only instance
of stressing non-abuse of newly expanded police
powers., After Terry v. Ohio came down, the writer
issued a training bulletin for the Denver Police on
"stop and frisk" which concluded in upper case:
"The "Stop and Frisk" decision is a decision
that expands proper police conduct in the search
and seizure area. It was handed down by a Court
who has demonstrated in the past that it is ex-
tremely suspicious of the policeman. The decision
rests a fairly wide discretion in the police in the
"stop and frisk" area and this discretion mast not be
abused or it is quite possible that the Court might
reverse itself and take the discretion away. If
police officers stay within the limitations of tle
decision it can be an extremely useful tooin fighting
crime. (emphasis in original). Carrington, Denver
Police Department Training Bulletin, "Terry v.
Ohio-the Stop and Frisk Decision-What it
Means to the Denver Police". p. 10
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cise of its rule-making power.' By the same token
Denver Police and Colorado law enforcement gen-
erally, bear a heavy responsibility to justify the
Court's consideration.
Speaking to the Legislature
The courses of action described above involving
the police speaking to the courts are rather unusual
procedures; that is, the idea of the police, as such,
filfng amicus briefs or requests for Rules of Criminal
Procedure is a relatively new idea and to date has
not been attempted to any great extent.
The more traditional course of action for the
police, in instances where they have spoken out,
has been to make their views known to the legisla-
tive bodies. Police articulation of problems before
legislative bodies will generally be the usual route
that future vocal policemen will take, although the
approach to the courts should not be minimized.
The results of speaking to the legislatures will,
naturally, vary from state to state and city to city,
and will depend largely on persuasive measures by
the police and upon how receptive the lawmakers
themselves are. One thing is certain, the better the
police prepare themselves with facts for the pres-
entation of their problems, the better the response
will be. It should again be emphasized that if the
police appear before the legislative bodies merely to
engage in hand-wringing and grumbling about
being handcuffed, they will do more harm than
good; this "shotgun" approach can only weaken
the overall effect of a more closely reasoned ap-
proach by other enforcement officers. Legislators,
in most instances, are professionals; many are at-
torneys, and the policeman should prepare his case
as thoroughly as an attorney prepares for court.
One further point should again be emphasized; the
police should stick to police problems in the areas of
the law about which they become articulate. Prob-
lems involving areas of the criminal law which are
collateral to direct police action, such as the actual
m On the question of Judicial Rule-in general, see
"Judicial Rule-Making is Alive but Ailing" by Judge
Robert M. Hale of the Georgia Court of Appeals,
55 ABAJ 637 (1969). One extremely practical point
might be made about the question of the police speak-
ing out to request either Statutes or Rules of Criminal
Procedure. If a police request is embodied in a Rule
of Criminal Procedure by the Supreme Court of the
state in question this Rule sits on very solid legal
ground. That is, even the lower echelons of state
courts may, upon occasion, take it upon themselves
to declare legislative enactments unconstitutional. It
would take a lower state court judge of extreme in-
testinal fortitude to declare a rule of procedure adopted
by his own Supreme Court unconstitutional.
trial of cases are not of direct concern to the police.
It is submitted that a District Attorney would
have every right to object if, without consulting
his office, the police in a given area presented a
request to the legislature concerning joinder of
defendants or the right to comment on certain
aspects of the case in opening or closing argument.
Such subjects are dearly the province of the Dis-
trict Attorney, and this province should not be
usurped by the police."M
This is not to say, however, that the police must
confine their articulation to the investigation
through arrest or pre-arraignment areas of the law.
Any area related to the law that directly affects
how a policeman does his job or that affects his
safety in doing his job is a valid field for comment.
Nevertheless, the vocal policeman, speaking as a
professional, should confine his expressions to those
professional matters in which he is directly inter-
ested.
In this section of this paper, dealing with speak-
ing to the legislatures, we will consider briefly
whether such articulation will produce any results.
One example of a fruitful approach by the Denver
Police to the Colorado Legislature again involves
the controversial Colorado Children's Code men-
tioned above. As originally enacted in 1967, the
Children's Code,135 stated that a child (that is, a
person under eighteen) 36 could be taken into
custody without a court order by a law enforcement
officer only if the child had committed any criminal
offense in the officer's presence or if there were
reasonable grounds to believe the child had com-
mitted a felony."' Thus, a child could not be ar-
rested without a court order in Colorado for misde-
meanors or ordinance violations not committed in
the officer's presence 3
The immediate result of this provision was that
"u In all of the cases mentioned in this paper where
the Denver Police approached the United States
Supreme Court or the Colorado Supreme Court or
Legislature, the Denver District Attorney's Office was
consulted and kept fully advised. Further, as noted
above, in the "night search warrant" Rule case, the
Denver Police approached the Colorado Supreme
Court through the good offices of the Denver District
Attorney's Office.
"35 Colorado Revised Stat., Ch. 22.
136 CRS 22-1-3 (3)
" CRS 22-2-1 (a) (b) (c) 1967.
383 Here the Children's Code differed from the gen-
eral law of arrest without warrant in Colorado as
CRS 39-2-20 permits arrest without warrant by an
officer if any criminal offense (felony, misdemeanor,
or ordinance violation) has been committed and the
officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person
to be arrested committed it.
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certain Colorado misdemeanors could be com-
mitted with relative impunity by children provided
an officer was not present. Simple assault and bat-
tery,8 9malicious damage to property not exceeding
$500,140 and theft of property of value under $100,1n
were all crimes for which an officer was powerless
to take a child into custody, without the time con-
suming process of obtaining a court order, unless
the officer had observed the violation.
The truly vicious juveniles soon learned of this
provision to their great glee and took full advan-
tage of it. Cases began to pour in to the Denver
Police Department's Delinquency Control Division
in which an officer had arrived at the scene of a
shoplifting, a pupil striking a teacher, or a wanton
destruction of property only to find a smirking
juvenile present daring the officer to do his worst.
This, of course, presented a very real and many-
faceted police problem. The juveniles who were
able to flaunt the law in the officers' faces certainly
were developing no respect for the law. An irate
store owner holding a juvenile for stealing a
sweater had to be told that the police were power-
less to act, and he would often blame the police-
man. Finally, the morale of the Denver officers was
not improved by being told to be on their way by
hulking seventeen-year-olds who have obviously
committed a crime, but who were clever enough
not to do so in the officer's presence.
As a result of this situation, in the spring of 1968,
William Hallman, the Chief of the Denver Police
Department's Delinquency Control Division, ap-
peared before the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees of the Colorado Legislature. He de-
scribed the problems caused by the lack of mis-
demeanor arrest powers for the police in the
Children's Code as written. In the 1968 Session, the
Colorado Legislature amended the arrest provisions
of the Children's Code to read:
"22-2-1 Taking Children Into Custody-(1) (a)
A child may be taken into temporary custody
by a law enforcement officer without order of
the court:... (c) When there are reasonable
grounds to believe that he has committed an
act that would be a felony, misdemeanor, or
municipal ordinance violation if committed by
an adult..." 142
"I CRS 40-2-35, a misdemeanor.
210 CRS 40-18-1, a misdemeanor.M CRS 40-5-2, (2) (a), a misdemeanor.2 Game, fish, parks and traffic violations are ex-
cluded from this provision but this does not cause any
This example of speaking to the legislature re-
sulted in the legislature acting in response to
articulated police problems. This is by no means
always the case. To date, all attempts by the
Denver Police and other law enforcement agencies"
in Colorado to persuade the legislature to allow
some flexibility in the rule requiring parental pres-
ence at all interrogations of childreni4 have met
with failure. The police cannot hope to be success-
ful in all cases in which they attempt to articulate
police problems to the legislature; however, the
juvenile arrest situation just described shows that
constructive results can often be accomplished. In
the latter instance the police were in a position to
see dearly how a provision of law was greatly
hampering police effectiveness, they spoke out on it
to the proper body and the situation was remedied.
It is submitted that, in cases like the Colorado
juvenile arrest situation, the police are derelict in
their duty if they do not speak out.
Speaking to the Public
This section is the last one in this article which
deals with whether or not speaking out by the
police will accomplish any results. In the prior sec-
tions concerned with addressing the courts and
legislatures definite results, positive or negative
from the police point of view, can be readily per-
ceived. Consider the "box score" so far. Articula-
tion of police problems has produced the desired
results in some cases and not in others:
In the United States Supreme Court:
1. "Stop and Frisk"--desired result obtained;
and
2. Chimel v. Calfornia-rehearing denied.
In the Colorado Supreme Court:
1. Night Search Warrant Rule--desired result
obtained; and
2. Court Order for Fingerprinting--desired
result obtained.
In the Colorado Legislature:
1. Arrest Power for juvenile Misdemeanors-
desired result obtained.
2. Flexibility in Parental Presence at Inter-
rogation Requirement-Negative, the legal
restrictions still apply.
particular problem for the police. The three critical
areas, malicious mischief, simple assault, and shop-
lifting, which caused the problems under the old
provision, have been resolved by the 1968 amendment.M CRS 22-2-2 (3) (c).
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Thus, in each of the above cases where the police
spoke out, the results can be seen. When the police
speak out to the public, there can be no definitive
result because the public cannot respond with a
"yes" or "no" legislative enactment or ruling.
Nevertheless, the duty of the police to speak out to
the public should not be minimized; for it is the
public to whom the duty of protection is owed, and
the public has a very clear cut right to know the
degree of protection it is receiving from the police
at any given time. For an example of speaking to
the public we again turn to the Colorado Children's
Code. The issue in this case was the question of the
handling of recidivist offenders in the Denver
Juvenile Courts. The speaker was Chief William
Hallman of the Denver Police Department's De-
linquency Control Division who is an extremely
articulate and outspoken policeman. The vehicle
was a report filed by Chief Hallman with Police
Chief George Seaton entitled, "Survey of Juvenile
Case Histories". This report, dated April 25, 1969
was released to the newspapers and received wide
publicity in Denver.144 The purpose of the report
was to make certain police problems public.
The report documented a study made by Chief
Hallman ". . . to determine the type and frequency
of juvenile crimes, the arrest frequency and case
disposition of the recidivist and whether or not the
present system, policies and laws governing the
handling of juveniles are effective".
The report criticizes the leniency shown to
recidivist juvenile offenders by the Denver Courts
and substantiates the criticism with facts. As a
starting point, Chief Hallman selected the case
history cards of 226 Denver juvenile recidivists at
random and tabulated the number of total arrests
for these offenders:
"Total Number of Cards and Cases Surveyed
Total persons .................... 226
Total arrests ..................... 2335
Average number of arrests per per-
son........................... 10.3".
The number of arrests for each individual varied
from five to twenty-nine times, and Chief Hallman
pointed out that in the majority of cases, it was
unusual for any punitive action to be taken until
after the fifth offense.
144 See: The Denver Post, April 27, 1969 "Youth
Crime Rate linked to Leniency" and the (Denver)
Rocky Mountain News, April 27, 1969--"Leniency
Hit in Juvenile Crime Report".
The report breaks the cases down by type of
crime and gives the figures as to cases disposed of
at the police level (e.g., lectured and released; prose-
cution refused; returned escapees). The report then
continues by pointing out that of 1498 cases with
which the study dealt, which were referred to the
Juvenile Court, only ninety-four persons were com-
mitted to Lookout Mountain School for Boys, the
Colorado juvenile correctional facility. This re-
sulted in an average of one commitment for each
15.9 cases. A full breakdown of escapes, parole
violations and persons returned to correctional
facility was also given.
In making this criticism of the leniency shown
by the Courts to recidivist juveniles, Chief Hall-
man points out that juveniles are committing 52
per cent of major crimes in Denver, and states his
feeling that this figure could be substantially re-
duced if the recidivists were properly restrained.
Therein lies the direct police involvement, referred
to above, for the Denver crime rate is most cer-
tainly of vital concern to the Denver Police De-
partment. Thus the report concludes:
"Surely, the problem of juvenile offenders,
particularly those who are arrested repeatedly,
and the problems they create for the commu-
nity, are of major concern to thePolice Depart-
ment and should be of prime concern to our
courts, institutions, and our legislators. This
concern must be reflected in adequate court
procedures, adequate laws and adequate facil-
ities for restraint if we are to lessen or solve the
problem".
This report, made public through the news
media, was no broadside polemic at leniency in the
abstract, but rather it was a carefully reasoned,
factual approach to a critical police problem. In
speaking for the police, Chief Hallman documented
his case well and attempted to make the public
aware of a situation that the police feel caused a
definite detriment to community safety.
As noted above in the area of speaking to the
public, a definitive "result" cannot be given. What
is important about Chief Hallman's report is that
it is a far cry from the inarticulate policeman who
grumbles in generalities about "turn-'em-loose"
courts. As a matter of fact, Judge Philip B. Gilliam,
the Presiding Judge of the Denver Juvenile Court
stated in an interview that, while he questioned
some points in Chief Hallman's report, he agreed
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with the report's criticism of leniency for hard-core
juvenile offenders.145
THE Fuv tnOto POLICE ARTICULATION
Proper police articulation has an almost un-
limited future, at least in such areas of the law as
are dealt with in this paper. In all of the examples
cited above which resulted in a positive response to
police articulation, one common factor stands out.
This is the fact that the police were able to articu-
late .(or to have articulated for them) the specific
police -problems that the laws or court decisions
were causing. This information is the kind of infor-
matibn which the courts and legislatures need if
they are to consider intelligently police problems;
and, as has been reiterated throughout this paper,
mly the police are in a position to present these
specific problems for consideration.
Senator John McClellan of Arkansas in a floor
speech to the United States Senate summed up one
aspect of the policeman's current position in our
criminal justice scheme:
"For as the [Supreme] Court has moved on
and on to more and more attenuated questions
of fairness, the single minded pursuit by some
jurist of individual rights defined by an 18th
Century ideal, but applied to a 20th Century
society, is threatening to alter the nature of the
criminal trial from a test of the defendant's
guilt or innocence to an inquiry into the pro-
priety of the policeman's conduct" 146
That this is true can be seen from the examples
given above. From the "round-up" tactics used in
Davis to the alert activities of Detective McFadden
in Terry, the light of scrutiny fell directly on the
police procedures used. The articulation of the
problems encountered by the police in real life
situations which lead to the use of a given police
procedure in a given case can help the reviewing
authority, court or legislature, to perceive the
difference between the enforcement of the law in
theory and the enforcement of the law in practice.
Judges and legislators do not, as a rule, go "on the
street" and witness the police problems first hand;
this is not their function; the duty then arises on
the part of the police to bring the "street" into the
15 See: The Denver Post, April 28, 1969: "Judge's
View-Leniency Issue Exceptions Told".
146 Senate Congressional Record 91st Cong. 1st
Sess. Vol. 115, No. 136, August 11, 1969, "The Use of
Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control Act".
courtroom or legislative chamber by a proper ar-
ticulation of the problems faced by those-who must
enforce the law.
WHO SHALL SPEAK FOR THE PoLIcE?
We have seen cases where various persons have
articulated police problems in the area of the law,
with varying degrees of success. The duty to speak
for the police has been postulated and illustrated
through this paper; the question remains: who
shall be the spokesman?
Ideally, the police should speak for the police.
Highly articulate command officers, like Chief
Hallman of the Denver Police Delinquency Con-
trol Division, are extremely effective in their pres-
entations because their listeners know that they
are speaking from experience gained in the practical
day-to-day application of police work. The problem
remains, however, that in the area of the law, the
courts and law makers are accustomed to be spoken
to by lawyers. Is a non-lawyer policeman fully
equipped to present the legal side of police prob-
lems? Can a police officer file a brief in. a court
without running afoul of his state's unauthorized
practice of law regulations? These and other ques-
tions regarding the expertise of the police in the
legal area present real problems.
The obvious answer, then, to the question of who
shall be the proper spokesman for the police is that
he be both policeman and lawyer. As it happens,
there is now in law enforcement a rapidly-growing
group of persons who fit this criterion: The Police
Legal Advisor.
The Police Legal Advisor is a relatively new
concept in law enforcement as we know it today;
yet, the concept is "catching on" across this
country with amazing rapidity. The Police Legal
Advisor is a policeman-lawyer whose duties com-
prise being a full or part-time counsel for a law en-
forcement agency. By far, the most important of
his duties is to advise the police on the law applica-
ble to their work-arrest, search and seizure, con-
fessions, line-ups, and so forth--so that their cases
will stand up under the in-court scrutiny that is a
part of our judicial process.'7
147In his speech before the International Associa-
tion of Chiefs of Police-above N.7 United States
Attorney General John Mitchell stressed the need for
police legal advisors as part of the administration's
crime control package for Washington, D.C.
"We have asked for an expansion of the Police
Legal Advisor office. These Legal Advisors are
available to advise police officers on the street




The impetus for the Police Legal Advisor con-
cept really began with the Task Force Report: The
Police, of the President's Commission on Law En-
forcement and the Administration of Justice which
devoted an entire Appendix to the need for at-
torneys in police departments. The Task Force
Report stressed this need because:
"In recent years, the criminal law has be-
come increasingly complex. The appellate
courts have dramatically enlarged their super-
vision over law enforcement agencies in opin-
ions that reflect a heightened concern with the
detail and routine of policing. These opinions
have narrowed the range of police behavior
and demanded more refined judgments at the
earliest stages of an investigation ... A mis-
taken conclusion by a patrolman, usually the
first officer on the scene, is often irredeemable,
dooming an entire investigation, particularly
if the error invokes one of the exclusionary
rules"48
As a partial solution to this problem the Com-
mission Report recommended the use of a full time
advisor for all major police departments and part-
time advisors for the smaller ones. 149 One of the
duties of the legal advisor, according to the Com-
mission, would be liaison with the legislature and
the community.
The Commission noted:
"Typically, police agencies are remote from
the legislative process. When law enforcement
officials do recite grievances, they commonly
do so without consideration of possible govern-
mental remedies. Consequently, areas which
are subject to legislative solutions often remain
ignored"j10
In effect, the Commission is suggesting that the
legal advisor could speak out on behalf of the
police.
Many of the advantages of having the legal ad-
visor as the spokesman for the police are apparent.
If he does his job properly he should have the re-
spect of both the law enforcement community and
the Bar. If, as is almost invariably the case, the
14 President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and the Administration of Justice: Task Force Re-
port: The Police p. 63.
149 President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and the Administration of Justice: Task Force Re-
port: The Police p. 65.
510 Ibid. p. 64.
legal advisor works directly with the police officers
on investigations, accompanying them on raids and
being present at riots and civil disorders, he will
have personal experience to draw on as to the
practical problems involved in those aspects of
police work that he is articulating."' Thus the
combination of legal training plus police experience
uniquely qualifies the legal advisor to speak for the
police.1 52
As of this writing, there are 27 city police depart-
ments, 2 county, and 5 state law enforcement
agencies utilizing the services of full or part time
legal advisors. The city departments include such
major cities as New York, Washington, D.C.,
Baltimore, New Orleans, Phoenix, Denver, and
San Francisco.
The need for Police Legal Advisors had been
anticipated with the 1964 funding of the Police
Legal Advisor Program at the Northwestern Uni-
versity School of Law. This Ford Foundation
sponsored program set up a means whereby Police
Legal Advisor fellowships could be granted to
young attorneys interested in careers in this field.
The program at Northwestern was set up under the
direction of Professor Fred. E. Inbau of the School
of Law and is currently administered by Professor
Inbau and Mr. Wayne Schmidt. Graduates of the
program have served, or are now serving, with
police departments in Phoenix, Dade County,
Florida, Orlando, Florida, San Jose, Denver,
Honolulu, Charlotte, North Carolina and Minne-
apolis. In addition, Police Legal Advisors in other
cities periodically receive training through the
Northwestern program.
The Law Enforcement Legal Unit, a national
professional association of Police Legal Advisors
represents the majority of police legal advisors in
the United States. This organization presents an-
other advantage to the legal advisor acting as the
spokesman for the police because an interchange of
I The sections on the necessity to speak out on
laws that increase the personal danger to the officer-
see pgs. 52 through 60, above, are based on the writer's
personal experience as a participant in the two raids
described. From these experiences, the writer was
able, to demonstrate how the application of certain
laws actually increases the danger to the police officers
involved.
112 Further information about the police legal ad-
visor concept in theory and practice may be found in:
Caplan, The Police Legal Advisor, 58 J. Calm. L.
Calm. P. S. 303 (1967). "Corpus Christi's Squad Car
Lawyer", an article in the Reporter, Jan. 12, 1967,
p. 43. "Legal Advisor", an article in the Police Chief,
Sept. 1969 by John Burpo, Legal Advisor, Tucson
Police Department.
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ideas from department to department is available
among the members.5
This is by no means to say that Police Legal Ad-
visors should be the only spokesmen for the police.
The excellent presentation by Professor Thompson
of the police point of view in the AELE brief in
Terry v. Ohio is but one example of the fact that
others who are not policemen or Police Legal Ad-
visors can be highly convincing. In the limited area
of articulating police problems of the legal nature,
however, it is submitted that a Police Legal Ad-
visor would be in a highly advantageous position
to be a police spokesman because of the dual as-
pects of his job.
CONCLUSION
In the interest of society as well as in its own
interest, law enforcement, as a profession, in this
iu For instance the case from Dade County Florida
cited above in footnote 38 was sent to the writer by
the Legal Advisor of the Dade County Public Safety
Director's Office pursuant to a request through the
Law Enforcement Legal Unit for examples of cases
where Chimel has definitely hampered police work.
country, must become articulate concerning the
law, and its impact on the effectiveness of law en-
forcement. This articulation must be constructive
and the duty to articulate police problems carries
with it the duty, where possible, to suggest feasible
alternatives to laws that hamper the police in their
duties. Most important, if police articulation re-
sults in laws or rules advantageous to police effec-
tiveness, the police must make every effort to
insure that such laws or rules are not abused.
No policeman is above the law, and he must
obey the laws and court decisions applicable to his
work whether he agrees with them or not. At the
same time, it is submitted that a constructive, well
reasoned articulation of police problems can be a
means of bringing about needed changes in the
laws which will, in turn, increase the professional
policeman's efficiency without a concomitant loss
in an individual's personal liberties or freedoms.
The need for this police articulation has never been
greater. It is no longer optional. It is a duty!
